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PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE POLITICS OF
CORPORATE PRESENCE: IDENTITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
MA CPHERSON V. BUICK
Jonathan Kahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pity the poor corporation!' It has long been recognized as a
"person" under American law2 and, generally speaking, people have
identities. But the corporation has been sadly overlooked in recent
debates about "identity politics." Identity politics asserts, among
other things, the importance of according due consideration to iden-
tity as an operative category for evaluating legal rights and duties.
What then is the legal significance of corporate identity? In this pa-
per I go back to the early twentieth century, when large-scale, com-
plex corporations first emerged as a dominant force in American life,
to consider how legal processes and institutions came to endow the
corporate person with attributes that gave it a specific type of
* Research Associate, Joint Degree Program in Law, Health & the Life
Sciences, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment & the Life
Sciences; Center Associate, Center for Bioethics; Adjunct Associate Professor
of Law, University of Minnesota. I would like to thank Carole Greenhouse,
Alice Hearst, and Karen-Sue Taussig for their thoughtful comments on an ear-
lier version of this Article.
1. Throughout this Article, I use the term "corporation" to refer specifi-
cally to business corporations as distinct from governmental, religious, or non-
profit corporations.
2. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886);
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250 (1819); SCoTr R.
BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY (1996); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 166-78 (1973); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
1870-1960, at 65-107 (1992).
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identity. My focus is the law of torts which I take to have been a
critical field for identifying and managing the newly emergent corpo-
ration. More specifically, I look at the emergence of product liability
law during the early twentieth century. My primary text is Benjamin
Cardozo's path breaking opinion in the 1916 case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.3 I argue that new doctrines of product liability con-
structed and enacted conceptions of corporate identity that situated
the corporation as "present" in its defective products such that it
might be held responsible for foreseeable harm they caused.
Product liability presents a flip side to the "politics of presence,"
in which the representation of corporate identity in its products pro-
vides the basis for imposing burdens rather than expressing interests.
Thus, in approaching corporate identity, this Article does not look at
such attributes as race, gender, or even nationality, although these are
significant issues and deserving of exploration. Rather, it examines
how the determination of corporate responsibility and liability under
particular rules of tort implicitly located, shaped, and bounded the
corporate entity. This, in turn, has powerful implications for how we
view the nature and legitimacy of corporate power in modem soci-
ety.
By defining the duties of the corporation to society, product li-
ability law implicated issues of agency, will, and responsibility that
are critical to elaborating a substantive conception of corporate iden-
tity. These conceptions have played a critical role in the develop-
ment of the standing and legitimacy of corporate power in American
society. Product liability law is of particular interest because it in-
volves actors, everyday people, external to corporations and inde-
pendent of the state who seek to invoke the power of the law to me-
diate and constrain corporate power. In the early decades of the
twentieth century, we thus see tort law emerging as a decentralized,
variable, and yet powerful and accessible means to contest and man-
age growing corporate power. Consumer empowerment, however,
did not come without a cost. Product liability also helped to legiti-
mize the proliferation of corporate products in society. Moreover, in
contrast to other methods of control, such as federal regulation,
product liability law fostered an atomized conception of corporate
3. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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responsibility in which isolated individual claims became the basis
for assessing the proper place of the corporation in modem society,
independent of more general concems for the common good.
The emergence of the modem large-scale corporate enterprise is
one of the major social, economic, and political developments of the
past century. These leviathans now so dominate the landscape that
their existence seems almost natural, certainly logical, and therefore
inevitable. Of course, this is not the case. Yet the powerful and per-
vasive presence of corporations in American life does tend to foster a
certain complacency as to their underlying nature. In many regards,
current understanding of corporations is derived from debates initi-
ated during the Progressive Era about the proper place and status of
the corporation in society. One may distinguish at least three major
sites through which knowledge and action regarding corporate iden-
tity were produced during this period: the state, corporations them-
selves, and society at large. Since the time of the Progressive Era it-
self, much has been written on state regulation of corporations, from
the liberalization of state incorporation laws to the development of
new federal schemes of commerce and antitrust regulation.4 More
recently, a rich and innovative literature has developed analyzing the
role of advertising and public relations as means through which cor-
porations constructed identities for themselves before the public.
I argue that product liability law provided an additional impor-
tant site in which actors in society at large were able to engage cor-
porations in a manner that implicitly defined and shaped corporate
identity and power in society. The state and corporations certainly
were not absent from the arena of tort law. Through the courts, the
state mediated, enabled, and often constrained encounters between
plaintiffs and corporations. Often, corporations themselves were
plaintiffs in tort actions against other corporations. Moreover, plain-
tiffs' attempts to engage corporations through the courts were further
4. See generally, BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 37 (writing that Congress
passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to regulate monopolies and unfair
trade restraints, while numerous states relinquished regulatory control over
corporations); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corpora-
tion in American Law, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1441, 1441-43 (1987) (noting that by
the late nineteenth century, states were abandoning their attempts to regulate
corporations through corporate charters).
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mediated by legal professionals. This intermingling of actors, how-
ever, enriches the field of tort law as a focus of analysis.
One might also reasonably look to the law of contracts as a site
for similar implicit constructions of corporate identity. I, however,
choose to focus on tort law for two main reasons. First, doctrinally,
tort law, especially the law of negligence, involves issues of agency,
will, and responsibility more immediately than contracts. This was
especially so during the early twentieth century when new under-
standings of the nature and scope of negligence law were undergoing
critical articulations and reevaluations. Second, contracts generally
involve a mutually consented-to agreement that the corporation vol-
untarily entered into and, so, had some power to shape. That is, con-
tracts involve the voluntary engagement of the corporation in a par-
ticular activity with a specific party chosen by the corporation. Tort
law is somewhat different. It tends to originate external to the corpo-
ration and is therefore less subject to corporate control. The plaintiff
in tort cases is not predetermined by the corporation's choice as in a
contract, but rather, may arise from any member of society that is
adversely affected by the corporation's products or actions. Thus, as
corporations came to pervade and dominate multifarious segments of
society, tort law provided an important avenue to engage, respond to,
and contest the terms of corporate power.
II. CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND CORPORATE IDENTITY
It is common knowledge today, at least in legal circles, that the
corporation is a person at law, with certain attendant rights and du-
ties. From Justice John Marshall's classic description in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, of the corporation as "an artificial being, in-
visible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,"5 to
the conclusory assertion in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad that a corporation was a person deserving of equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 it seems axiomatic that cor-
porations are legal persons-or one might say they are endowed with
personality by the law.
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 303.
6. 118 U.S. at 394.
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During the early twentieth century, however, as corporations be-
came giant national institutions commanding huge amounts of labor
and capital, new attention was focused upon their peculiar nature and
status before the law. The question of corporate personality was cer-
tainly discussed before the 1900s, 7 but with Frederick Maitland's
translation and introduction to Otto Gierke's Political Theories of the
Middle Ages in 1900, a lively and long-sustained transatlantic debate
over the nature of corporate personality developed among legal and
political theorists. Thus, as Morton Horwitz has noted:
Beginning in the 1890s and reaching a high point around
1920, there is a virtual obsession in the legal literature with
the question of corporate personality. Over and over again,
legal writers attempted to find a vocabulary that would en-
able them to describe the corporation as a real or natural en-
tity whose existence is prior to and separate from the state.
8
Everybody seemed to have something to say on the subject. In addi-
tion to Maitland, an illustrative, though not exhaustive, list of some
of the more articulate and influential contributors to the debate in-
cludes Thurman Arnold, Adolf Berle, Morris Cohen, John Dewey, E.
Merrick Dodd, Harold Laski, Arthur Machen, Max Radin, Paul Vi-
nogradoff, and I. Maurice Wormser.
9
7. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS
(1987).
8. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 101.
9. See, e.g.,'THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 185-
206 (1937); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIvATE PROPERTY (1933); 1. MAURICE WORMSER,
FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED (1931); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of En-
terprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947); Morris R. Cohen, Communal
Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy, 16 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI.
METHODS 673 (1919); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate
Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Dogma and
Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REv. 977 (1929); Harold J.
Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Arthur
W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 357-65 (1911);
Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L.
REV. 643 (1932); Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 594
(1924). For an extensive review of European theoretical writings on corporate
personality, see FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY: A STUDY IN
JURISPRUDENCE (1930).
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Discussions of corporate personality ranged from issues of
criminal liability to diversity jurisdiction and tax law. Over time,
three basic models of corporate personality emerged from the de-
bates. First, going back at least to Marshall's opinion in Dartmouth,
was the fiction theory which, to varying degrees, held that the corpo-
ration was a mere creature of the state whose existence depended
upon the legislative privilege of granting a corporate charter. I Pro-
ponents of the fiction theory also looked to Friedrich Karl von Savi-
gny, a German theorist of the mid-nineteenth century, as a major ex-
positor of this view.11 Second, a partnership or contractual paradigm
treated corporations as private entities existing independent of the
state but virtually equivalent to partnerships. Third, was the "real en-
tity" theory, influenced by Gierke and Maitland, which argued that
corporate personality was as real as the underlying business entity
composed of persons coming together to do business in common.1
2
Under this theory, the grant of a charter from the state merely recog-
nized and conferred certain rights upon the preexisting real entity.
13
Given the rise of liberal general incorporation laws during the 1890s,
this argument took on added force as the granting of corporate char-
ters became almost pro forma.14 A separate approach denied the
10. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 303-04.
11. See, e.g., ALEXANDER NtKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE
LEGAL ENTITY 22, 64-65 (1938); Machen, supra note 9, at 255. Among some
theorists, the "fiction" theory is distinguished from the "concession" theory of
corporate personality. The former drew on medieval doctrine to emphasize the
purely incorporeal, conceptual nature of the corporation; the latter, essentially
a product of the rise of the nation-state, emphasized that the corporation ex-
isted only as sanctioned by prescription of license from the state. See, e.g.,
Dewey, supra note 9, at 665-69. Both, however, may be distinguished from
the natural entity theory which posits an independent social and economic exis-
tence for the business entity. See HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 100-05.
12. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 100-05; NtKAM, supra note 11, at
53, 73; Machen, supra note 9, at 256.
13. See HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 100-05.
14. See id. Morton Horwitz distinguished two theories from the fictional or
artificial entity approach. First, was a contractualist or partnership approach
which emphasized the group nature of corporations; second, was the natural
entity theory which "capitalize[d] on the language of natural rights individual-
ism by portraying the corporation as just another right-bearing person."
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 104. Mark Hager adopts a similar tripartite analysis
of theories of corporate personality, distinguishing a fiction theory, a contrac-
tualist-association paradigm and a real-entity theory. See Mark M. Hager,
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utility of employing the metaphor of corporate personality altogether,
asserting that debates over the real or fictional status of the corporate
person obscured a clear understanding of the practical functioning of
the corporation.
15
Commenting on some of the practical implications of corporate
personification, Scott Bowman argues that:
Corporate enterprise could not have secured its extraordi-
nary legal privileges or achieved ideological acceptance so
readily [during the Progressive Era] without assuming the
guise of personhood in a market economy.... Both the le-
gal edifice of corporate power and its ideological justifica-
tion in the law have been built on legal and moral concep-
tions of the corporate individual.
16
As Alexander Ndkfn noted in 1938, both fiction and real-entity
theories of corporate personality shared the same fundamental as-
sumption that human personality was a natural foundation of legal
predicates. 17  Anthropomorphizing the corporation, such theories
contributed to the dynamic observed by Bowman whereby the con-
cept of the corporation as an individual facilitated social acceptance
of the large corporation by recasting its image from one of inefficient
monopoly into an entrepreneurial person, fully in line with the indi-
vidualistic premises of American liberalism. 18
A. The State Shaping Corporate Identity
In the early nineteenth century, corporations were few and lim-
ited in their operations. 19 Legal and political management of corpo-
rations was largely informed by the concession or grant theory of the
corporation as an artificial entity.20 As manifest in the political
mechanism of the special charter, grant theory in action meant that
Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" The-
ory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 579-82 (1989); see also Mark, supra note 4, at
1464-78.
15. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9; Dewey, supra note 9; Radin, supra note
9.
16. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
17. See NKAM, supra note 11, at 53.
18. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 8-9.
19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 166.
20. See id.; HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 72.
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corporations could only come into being as legally sanctioned enti-
ties subject to special legislative acts specific to the particular enter-
prise.21 Special charters dictated stringent requirements concerning
such things as a defined corporate purpose, duration of existence,
voting rights of stockholders, and levels of capitalization. 2 In part,
responding to Jacksonian claims that special charters encouraged un-
democratic monopolies, legislatures began to make the corporate
form more freely available in the 183 Os.23 By the mid-nineteenth
century, a trend began toward the liberalization of incorporation law
resulting in reduced state control over the internal management of
corporate affairs and broader access to corporate charters. 24 Then, by
the last decade of the nineteenth century, a virtual revolution in state
regulation of corporations occurred. 25 Led by New Jersey and Dela-
ware, states began to revise incorporation laws so as to "eliminate[]
restrictions on a variety of essential matters, including capitalization
and assets, mergers and consolidations, the issuance of voting stock,
the purpose(s) of incorporation, and the duration and locale of busi-
ness."
26
As American industrial enterprise took off in the aftermath of
the Civil War, new forms of corporate organization and legal regula-
tion developed to manage and, in some cases, facilitate the emer-
gence of large-scale corporate entities.27 Led by the railroads, great
national combines formed during the 1880s and 1890s.28 New forms
of management and organization structured the large corporations
21. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 51-53; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 166;
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 72.
22. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 51; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 167-68;
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 72.
23. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 51; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 168-69;
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 73.
24. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 42-52; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 166-
69; HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 73.
25. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 60.
26. Id.
27. See CREATING MODERN CAPITALISM: HOW ENTREPRENEURS,
COMPANIES, AND COUNTRIES TRIUMPHED IN THREE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTIONS 315-24 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1997) [hereinafter CREATING
MODERN CAPITALISM].
28. See LOUIS GALAMBOS & JOSEPH PRATT, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE
COMMONWEALTH: U.S. BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 34 (1988).
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internally so as to improve the efficiency of production, transporta-
tion, and distribution of goods.29 New methods of financing ex-
tended capital markets to draw on the resources of diverse sharehold-
ers and concentrate large amounts of capital under the control of a
single firm.
30
The increasing independence and autonomy of corporations con-
firmed and enabled the ascendance of the natural entity theory as the
basic legal paradigm for conceptualizing the personality of the cor-
poration.31 It also facilitated the separation of ownership from con-
trol of the major corporate enterprises of the day.32 As capital mar-
kets expanded, corporate shareholders grew in number and became
more diffuse.33 At the same time, fueled by greater concentrations of
capital from new shareholders, corporations developed new and
complex structures of management and organization to oversee their
burgeoning operations and infrastructure.34 As most influentially,
though not originally, articulated by Berle and Means, this led to a
separation of ownership by the shareholders from control by profes-
sional managers.35 This new corporate entity as regulated by the
29. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 456, 464-68 (1977); CREATING
MODERN CAPITALISM, supra note 27, at 336-39.
30. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9, at 1-46; CHANDLER, supra
note 29, at 455 passim; CREATING MODERN CAPITALISM, supra note 27, at
303-48; GALAMBoS & PRATT, supra note 28, at 28-36; EDWARD C.
KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE: BUSINESS, LABOR AND PUBLIC POLICY
1860-1897 43-74, 163-80, 216-36 (1961).
31. See HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 100-05.
32. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9, at 69.
33. See id. at 47.
34. See CHANDLER, supra note 29, at 455-56.
35. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9, at 1-6, 127-41. For interesting ear-
lier examinations of this phenomenon, see WALTER LiPPMANN, DRIFT AND
MASTERY: AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST 35-44 (1914);
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1921). Gregory
Alexander posits three factors to explain the influence of Berle and Means:
First, they backed up their observations with statistical data; second, timing-
the book's publication at the height of the Depression in 1933 found the public
receptive to a critical treatment of corporate power; and third, its functional
and institutionalist approach to the study of corporations that, in effect, fi-
nessed previous questions of corporate personality that had raged during the
previous three decades. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY &
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY N AMERICAN LEGAL
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state, was not only "real," it was also reconfigured. Shareholders
stood outside of, and therefore did not in any significant way consti-
tute the identity of, giant corporate enterprises.36 In part, this had
been a basic purpose of the business corporation since its rise in the
early nineteenth century. Such separation of identity provided the
conceptual basis for limited liability.37 Shareholders could only be
reached by "piercing the veil" of corporate identity.38 But increas-
ingly, as the liberalization of incorporation law in the 1890s enabled
a massive wave of corporate mergers between 1898 and 1904, veil
piercing would come to involve attempts to reach a parent corpora-
tion through a subsidiary. 39 Indeed, such laws not only facilitated the
rapid emergence of giant corporations, they also resulted in the pro-
liferation of new corporate "family trees," where the business
equivalent of complex "kinship networks" would develop and pro-
vide the basis for an increasingly elaborate legal doctrine where
claimants sought to pierce the veil of one corporation's identity to
reach a related parent, subsidiary, or "sibling" corporation.
Perhaps the most fiercely debated issue arising out of corporate
concentration involved antitrust regulation and related concerns over
the moral status of big, as opposed to small, business. Between 1890
and 1914, the "trust" question pervaded American political culture as
the first large-scale, integrated corporate enterprises emerged on a
national level. 40 Martin Sklar characterizes this as a period of "cor-
porate reconstruction of American capitalism" that involved:
[A] pandemic conflict engendered by the larger conflict be-
tween two major forms of capitalist property and their cor-
responding modes of consciousness, or bewteen [sic] two
historical stages of capitalist society: the proprietary-
competitive market stage and the corporate-administered
THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 345-46 (1997).
36. See I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12
COLUM. L. REv. 496 (1912).
37. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS
50 (1988).
38. This phrase was first used by I. Maurice Wormser in his article Piercing
the Veil of Corporate Entity. See Wormser, supra note 36 passim.
39. See SKLAR, supra note 37, at 51-52.
40. See id. at 98-99.
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market stage, the one receding before but leaving its indeli-
ble marks upon the ascendancy of the other .... 41
Each form of "capitalist property" implicated different principles and
schemes of corporate law, and as each vied for preeminence, corpo-
rate law experienced a period of rapid development and instability.42
Indeed, Sklar sees the law as a major terrain of contest between the
two orders. 43
In particular, Sklar notes a tendency in the courts to favor the
older, proprietary-competitive model associated with a more small-
producer or populist outlook on the corporation, while the public law
actions of the elected branches of the federal government favored an
emergent large-producer, corporate-capitalist outlook.44  Before
1911, the courts rigorously enforced prohibitions on restraint of trade
that "obstructed and inhibited the development of the administered
market regime envisioned by partisans of the corporate reorganiza-
tion."45 On the other hand, the Bureau of Corporations, created un-
der Theodore Roosevelt's administration in 1903, consistently cam-
paigned for a more liberal construction of antitrust laws forbidding
only "unreasonable" restraints of trade.46
The period of conflict and uncertainty was ultimately resolved
between 1911 and 1914, first by the Supreme Court's famous "Rule
of Reason" decisions in Standard Oil Co. v. United States47 and
United States v. American Tobacco Co.48 that reinstated the old
common law rule that only unreasonable restraints of trade were pro-
hibited by antitrust law; and second, by the adoption of the Clayton
Act and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in
1914.49 In Sklar's view, these actions largely resolved the trust ques-
tion in favor of a "policy of allocating to private parties the primary
role, the initiative, in regulating the market, and to government,
through executive oversight and judicial process, a secondary,
41. Id. at 20.
42. See id. at 47-53.
43. See id. at 89.
44. See id. at 91-93.
45. Id. at 92.
46. See id. at 184-90.
47. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
48. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
49. See SKLAR, supra note 37, at 48-49, 89-90, 146-73, 182-83.
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reactive role."50 This ultimately resulted in a "nonstatist accommo-
dation of the law to the corporate reorganization of capitalism."
51
Of particular interest in understanding evolving conceptions of
corporate identity is the notion that the legal and political resolution
of the trust question allocated regulatory initiative to private parties.
Such a grant reflects the preeminence of a natural entity conception
of the corporation. Morton Horwitz argues that the triumph of the
real or natural entity theory in Progressive Era legal thought served
"to legitimate large-scale enterprise and to destroy any special basis
for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its creation
by the state." 52 In important and powerful ways, the development of
explicit theories of corporate personality thus facilitated and legiti-
mized the emergence of the modem business corporation. As Hor-
witz indicates, however, legal doctrines of corporate personality fo-
cused primarily on the relation between the corporation and the
state.53 Its impact was therefore limited primarily to the important
but hardly all-encompassing sphere of state regulation of the corpo-
ration.
Nonetheless, paraphrasing Sklar, one might also argue that the
resolution of the trust issue also located the primary responsibility
and impetus for continuing to shape corporate identity in the private
arena with the state playing only a "secondary, reactive role."
54
Most immediately, this dynamic became manifest in the blossoming
of corporate advertising and public relations on a national scale,
regulated only by the FTC and related common law and statutory re-
strictions of fraud and misrepresentation. 55 In this arena, the corpo-
ration became the preeminent expositor of a new vision of corporate
56identity. But the "private parties" Sklar alludes to might also be
understood to encompass members of society at large.57 Thus, in the
hands of private parties, both corporations and citizens, tort law
50. Id. at 169.
51. Id. at 173.
52. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 104.
53. See id. at 100-05.
54. See SKLAR, supra note 37, at 169.
55. See id. at 166-71.
56. See STEWART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING
AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF CONSUMER CULTURE 81-82 (1976).
57. See id. at 168-69.
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emerged as an additional site for articulating and contesting concep-
tions of corporate identity. Here, too, through the courts, the state
was relegated to a secondary, reactive-though significantly ena-
bling-role.
B. The Corporation Shaping Its Own Identity
As the burgeoning literature on the development of modem ad-
vertising and public relations attests, corporations themselves had a
major hand in shaping their identity as presented to the consuming
public.8 Roland Marchand directly examined this phenomenon in
his richly detailed historical study, Creating the Corporate Soul:
The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American
Big Business.59 Marchand, in fact, opens his book with a brief dis-
cussion of the infamous 1886 Supreme Court case of Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., in which the Court "be-
stowed upon the business corporation, under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, the legal status of 'person.' 60 Mar-
chand goes on to chronicle growing concern within the corporation
that society at large was coming to view the large combines of the
early twentieth century as "soulless" behemoths that dominated the
economic landscape without a conscience or concern for the consum-
ing public.61 To counter the resultant alienation and dissatisfaction-
and consequent erosion of the corporation's social legitimacy-
corporations developed ever more sophisticated techniques of adver-
tising and public relations to imbue their businesses with "soul"--
58. See, e.g., EWEN, supra note 56; STUART EWEN, P.R.!: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF SPIN (1996); WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS,
POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN CULTURE (1993); JACKSON
LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN
AMERICA (1994); ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR MODERNITY, 1920-1940 (1986); JAMES D.
NORRIS, ADVERTISING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY,
1865-1920 (1990).
59. ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS
(1998).
60. Id. at 7.
61. See id. at 7-8.
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that is, with a distinctive identity that consumers would find familiar
and attractive.
62
Through case studies of such emerging corporate giants as
AT&T and General Motors, Marchand explores how businesses
showcased everything, from the skyscrapers that housed their corpo-
rate headquarters to the biographies of their founders, to evoke asso-
ciations of stability, uplift, and human ingenuity.63 Thus, for exam-
ple, in the case of AT&T, Marchand shows how Theodore Vail, upon
becoming president of the powerful monopoly in 1908, embarked on
"the first, most persistent, and most celebrated of the large-scale in-
stitutional advertising campaigns of the early twentieth century. Its
primary purpose was political-to protect a corporation with an odi-
ous public reputation against threats of public ownership or hostile
regulation." 64 AT&T succeeded spectacularly through such tactics
as promoting employees who came in frequent contact with the pub-
lic, such as line workers and operators, that put a human face on the
corporation.
6 5
C. Society Shaping Corporate Identity
Corporate public relations images of business did not go uncon-
tested. From the targeted muckraking of Ida Tarbell and Upton Sin-
clair, to the more general critiques of corporate culture found in such
writers as Sinclair Lewis, counter-narratives of the soulless or "bad"
corporation continued to abound. 66 What muckrakers and corpora-
tions had in common was their audience. Each sought to construct
images of corporate identity in the minds of the public. They pre-
sented images, slogans, facts, and stories to substantiate and make
comprehensible the otherwise distant, complex, and amorphous
business entities that were coming to dominate social, economic, and
political life in America. The battle to construct corporate identity,
therefore, ironically involved little direct engagement with the
62. See id. at 10.
63. See id. at 10, 36, 130.
64. Id. at 48.
65. See id. at 63-69.
66. See SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBIT (1998); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE
(1985); IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY
(David M. Chalmers ed., 1966).
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corporation itself. It took place in the arena of public opinion, out-
side of the boundaries of the corporations themselves. Corporations
were constructing and projecting identities outward to the public.
Muckrakers and other critics similarly asserted alternative visions of
the corporation for public consumption. Neither process involved
actors external to the corporation seeking to engage the corporation
directly in a manner that constructed or imposed identity upon it.
The remainder of this Article will be devoted to exploring the pecu-
liar dynamic of how product liability law became a site for such di-
rect engagement, with powerful implications for the implicit elabora-
tion of corporate identity in the era of the triumph of corporate
capitalism.
III. TORT LAW AND CORPORATE IDENTITY
In his 1924 article, Juridical Persons, Paul Vinogradoff, in dis-
cussing theories of corporate personality, asserted that:
A touchstone of the two theories [a fiction or real entity] is
presented by the application to corporations of the law of
torts. As long as we deal with property or contract we can
use both theories indifferently, but when we come to torts
we are embarrassed by the necessity of admitting certain
ethical and psychological features which cannot be dealt
with on the basis of the theory of fiction.
67
The issue for Vinogradoff was how torts involved attributing respon-
sibility to corporate actors just as we do to natural persons. The area
of tort law with the greatest practical implications for corporate re-
sponsibility and corporate power was negligence.6" Before the Civil
War, torts was not even considered a distinct branch of the law.
69
The rise of the modem negligence doctrine bears an important rela-
tion to the increasing complexity of social and industrial life and the
rise of industrial accidents during the last third of the nineteenth cen-
tury.70 In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in his influential book,
67. Vinogradoff, supra note 9, at 602.
68. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 16 (1980).
69. See id. at 4-14.
70. See id. at 15-19; see also Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, So-
cial Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50
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The Common Law, took the significant step of isolating negligence
as a comprehensive principle in tort law.71 G. Edward White argues
that Holmes' contribution was important in two respects:
First, it systematized an embryonic expansion in American
case law of the meaning of negligence from that of neglect
of a specific, predetermined duty to that of a violation of a
more general duty potentially owed to all the world. Sec-
ond, Holmes's isolation of "modem negligence" was to
provide Torts with a philosophical principle: no liability
for tortious conduct absent fault, with fault to be determined
by reference to "motives of policy" or "the felt necessities
of the times." Within a short space of time, that principle
came to dominate tort law.
72
By the early twentieth century, tort law remained essentially a
common law subject dominated by negligence principles that had
become increasingly systematized over the years.73 It was affected
by social and industrial developments, but in practice the develop-
ment of negligence, in particular, "emphasized limitations on liability
as much as it widened the potential scope of civil duties. 74
A central component of ongoing efforts to systematize tort law
was the Restatement of Torts, compiled during the 1920s and first
published in 1934.75 The Restatement defined the word "act as "an
external manifestation of the actor's will. ' 76 In a further comment it
stated that "there cannot be an act without volition." 77 When applied
to corporations, the law of torts implicates an understanding of the
corporate person as having will and volition. As courts increasingly
were called upon to evaluate claims against rapidly proliferating cor-
porations, they necessarily had to try to locate corporate will and
(1967) (discussing the evolution of the law of industrial accidents and work-
men's compensation).
71. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 63-129 (Mark
DeWolf Howe ed., 1963).
72. WHITE, supra note 68, at 13.
73. See id. at 57, 61.
74. Id. at 61.
75. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934).
76. Id. at § 2.
77. Id. at § 2 cmt. a.
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volition in specific contexts.78 In so doing, they effectively limned
the contours of identity for the corporate person.
79
As the Restatement itself indicates, Benjamin Cardozo, a mem-
ber of the Council of the American Law Institute, "attended a very
considerable number of the conferences relating to the subject-
matter" of the Restatement of Torts.80 In his exhaustive biography of
Cardozo, Andrew Kaufman shows how Cardozo influenced, and in
turn had his judicial opinions influenced by, the work of the Council
on the Restatement.
8 1
Cardozo was one of the major tort theorists of his day and per-
haps the most influential judge in the field. Cardozo's opinions ex-
hibit an acute awareness of Holmes' concern to meet "the felt neces-
sities of the time."82 He took an empirical and pragmatic approach to
judging.8 3 He generally tried to put claims in their historical and so-
cial context. 84 Richard Posner characterizes Cardozo's "rejection of
essentialism" as "facilitative .... [A]s a service to lay communities
in the achievement of those communities' self-chosen ends rather
than as a norm imposed.on those communities in the service of a
higher end." 85 In his posthumous tribute to Cardozo, Warren Seavey
saw torts as the field closest to Cardozo's heart. 86 Seavey asserted
that:
It is not chance that he (Cardozo) was at his best in this
field which touches most closely the everyday life of the
community. Impatient of purely legalistic reasoning, inter-
ested primarily in people rather than in the intricacies of
business, he found in torts perhaps the best field for the ex-
pression of his philosophy of life.
87
78. See Vinogradoff, supra note 9, at 595, 603.
79. See id. at 604.
80. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS xii-iii (1934).
81. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDoZO 174-75, 287-95 (1998).
82. HOLMES, supra note 71, at 5.
83. See KAUFMAN, supra note 81, at 134.
84. See id. at 134-35.
85. RIcHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 93-94
(1990).
86. See Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52
HARv. L. REV. 372, 373 (1939).
87. Id. at 373-74. Referring to Seavey's work, Walter Probert notes that
"Cardozo's ultimate appeal seems more to have been to a moral dimension of
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Ironically, Cardozo's very concern for the "everyday life of the
community" led him to write tort opinions that had profound
implications for the "intricacies of business" that, to Seavey at least,
seemed of less interest to him.88 Cardozo was indeed "interested
primarily in people," and so in dealing with business in negligence
cases, his opinions were informed by an ethical sensibility that im-
parted duty, agency, and will to the corporation in a manner that
"fleshed out" the identity of the corporate person.89 Of his many
writings and opinions of torts, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.9" had
profound implications as a basis for engaging and managing corpo-
rate power.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE CORPORATION: MACPHERSON V. BUICK
A. Background
Stephen Skowronek refers to the period from 1877 to 1900 as a
triumph for what he terms "the state of courts and parties."91 In the
field of business regulation in particular, Skowronek argues that the
courts played a preeminent role in structuring relations between the
state and emerging national corporations. 92 Only after 1900 did this
"patchwork" approach give way to a more systematic "reconstruc-
tion" of state administrative power that "replac[ed] courts and parties
with national bureaucracy." 93 This is reasonably accurate and in-
sightful insofar as one focuses on efforts directed self-consciously
toward using the state to develop comprehensive statutory schemes
to regulate business. Tort law, however, also functioned during this
period as a means to engage and manage corporate action in society.
For example, in their classic article, Social Change and the Law of
tort law, to a principle, or even an ideal that had a continuing influence over
the years." Walter Probert, Applied Jurisprudence: A Case Study of Interpre-
tive Reasoning in MacPherson v. Buick and Its Precedents, 21 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 789, 797 (1988).
88. See Seavey, supra note 86, at 373-74.
89. See id. at 374-93.
90. 111N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
91. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 39
(1982).
92. See id. at 19-46, 121-62.
93. Id. at 287.
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Industrial Accidents, Lawrence Friedman and Jack Ladinsky explore
how tort law developed in the second half of the nineteenth century
in direct relation to rapid industrial growth. 94 In particular, they
show how tort law could be a powerful instrument in the hands of
industrial workers who demanded compensation for injuries suffered
at the hands of fellow workers; so much so, that courts extended the
"fellow-servant" rule to shield corporations from extensive liability
claims that might impede more rapid industrial development. 5 As
exceptions to the rule proliferated, pressure grew to impose some
sort of legislative resolution to such challenges from workers.
96
Thus, between 1910 and 1920, workmen's compensation statutes
proliferated across the United States, effectively removing industrial
accidents from the realm of tort law.
97
As legislatures were appropriating the law of industrial acci-
dents to regulated statutory schemes, the courts were extending tort
law to incorporate a new type of accident resulting from the next
stage of industrialization-product liability. Here, the injured party
was not a worker in a factory but the consumer, remote from the cor-
poration, who bought a defective product through a middleman
within a web of extended market relations that might range across
the entire nation.
During the nineteenth century, the rule of privity of contract
governed most relations between buyers and sellers of products in
the market. Briefly stated, privity meant that a seller was liable for
defects in the product sold only to the immediate purchaser with
whom he had contracted.98  The leading authority on privity was
Winterbottom v. Wright,9 9 an English case from 1842 in which the
driver of a stagecoach suffered an injury when the coach broke down
and turned over.100 The driver brought suit not against his employer,
but against the contractor who had agreed with the employer to
94. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 70, at 52.
95. See id. at 58.
96. See id. at 70.
97. See id.
98. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842); see also
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral ofMacPherson, 146
U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1750-52 (1998).
99. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
100. See id. at 403.
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supply and keep the coach in good repair. 101 The court denied any
recovery on the ground that there was no "privity of contract" be-
tween the parties and hence, the contractor owed no duty of care to
the driver. 02 In subsequent cases, exceptions to the rule were gradu-
ally carved out, allowing recovery in the absence of privity in certain
special situations.10 3 The foundational case in this regard was Tho-
mas v. Winchester,10 4 an 1852 decision in which a customer who
purchased a mislabeled bottle of poison from a druggist recovered
damages from the original seller who supplied the bottle to the drug-
gist. The rationale was that inherently dangerous products such as
poisons demanded greater care in handling and foresight as to future
uses on the part of producers and sellers.1
0 5
Under these limited conditions, liability for defectively manu-
factured products remained largely confined to the arena of contract
law during the nineteenth century. A person harmed by a product
generally had legal recourse only against the person from whom she
had purchased the item. In a localized economy, dominated by face-
to-face market transactions, this often meant that the purchaser had
recourse against the actual producer. Moreover, as William Landes
and Richard Posner have observed, most consumer products of this
era were "simple" in the sense that the consumer could determine
their quality relatively easily through simple inspection.0 6 Landes
101. See id.
102. See id. at 405. For an analysis of Winterbottom as a classic "no duty"
case, see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 98, at 1750-52.
103. See, e.g., Thomas v. Winchester 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 409-11.
106. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 284-85 (1987). Landes and Posner give the exam-
ple of a cantaloupe, "whose ripeness can be determined by squeezing," as one
such "simple" product. Ironically, William Prosser earlier observed that "[t]he
extension of... strict liability to third persons with whom the seller had made
no contract came after the turn of the century... [in] the aftermath of a pro-
longed and violent national agitation over defective food .... ." William L.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L. J. 1099, 1104 (1960). Of course, this shift reflects the industrializa-
tion of food production by such corporate giants as Armour and other meat
packers whose practices notoriously formed the model for Upton Sinclair's
muckraking novel, The Jungle. This shows how food, a once seemingly sim-
ple and accessible product can be rendered distant, complex, and obscure
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and Posner contrast such "simple" goods with "experience" and
"credence" goods, which came to dominate consumer markets in the
twentieth century. 117 "'Experience' goods require use rather than
merely touching or inspection to reveal their qualities."' 8 Credence
goods "may not reveal their true attributes even after substantial
use."'109 Landes and Posner offer automobiles as an example of a
typical credence good. 110 Automobiles are an especially apt example
because they are classic emblems of modem urban industrial Amer-
ica. By the early twentieth century, automobiles were being pro-
duced by large corporations and distributed nationally through net-
works of intermediary dealers who were often distant from the point
of production."' Indeed, the automobile also grew to become per-
haps the archetypical representation of modem consumer society. It
is fitting, therefore, that the automobile also provided the site for
Benjamin Cardozo's famous "assault on the citadel of privity" 112 in
the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,113 the foundation
of the modem doctrine of products liability.
The case involved the collapse of a Buick Model 10 automobile
due to a defective wheel. 114 Donald MacPherson had purchased the
car from Close Brothers, a retail dealership, but he chose to sue
Buick for negligence."15 In his opinion, Cardozo stated the basic is-
sue as "whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to
any one [sic] but the immediate purchaser.""l 6 Close Brothers was
the immediate purchaser and hence "in privity" with Buick."
7
MacPherson was a subsequent purchaser not in privity with Buick."18
There was no doubt that MacPherson could sue Close Brothers, but
allowing MacPherson to trace liability back to Buick would have
through processes of industrialization in a national market economy.
107. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 106, at 284-85.
108. Id. at284.
109. Id. at 285.
110. See id. at 284-85.
111. Seeid. at285.
112. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
113. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
114. See id. at 1051.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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powerful and far reaching consequences---especially in an increas-
ingly national market economy dominated by extended transactions
where more and more goods flowed across many miles and through
many hands before reaching their ultimate users.
Reviewing a variety of previous cases, Cardozo distinguished
Winterbottom with the terse assertion that "[p]recedents drawn from
the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel to-
day."'119 Instead, he chose to expand upon the exceptions laid down
by cases such as Thomas as a basis for upholding the imposition of
liability upon Buick, even in the absence of privity.120 Richard Pos-
ner notes that Cardozo's tone throughout the opinion was "qualified.
. .modest ... [and] reticent." 121 Such rhetorical tact characterized
many of Cardozo's opinions and is generally construed as a key ele-
ment of their influence. Cardozo had a way of making radical inno-
vation appear logical, reasonable, even pedestrian.
Perhaps this tension between tone and import accounts for some
divergence among subsequent evaluations of the significance of Car-
dozo's opinion. Posner, for example, calls MacPherson "Cardozo's
most important opinion in terms of impact on the law" and attributes
"its rapid adoption by other states" to its quiet tone.1 22 The opinion
owes its impact, in part, to its effective incorporation into the Re-
statement of Torts, then being compiled-with Cardozo's active par-
ticipation-by the American Law Institute. 123 While Posner's view
is shared by many, others have argued that liability beyond privity of
contract "was [a] familiar doctrine to the New York Court of Ap-
peals before [MacPherson],"'124 and observed that at least through the
1930s, the doctrine of Winterbottom continued to hold sway in most
jurisdictions. 25  Cardozo himself noted in 1924 that the "current"
119. Id. at 1053.
120. See id.
121. POSNER, supra note 85, at 109.
122. Id.
123. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 395-96 (1934).
124. Robert Martin Davis, A Re-Examination of the Doctrine ofMacPherson
v. Buick and Its Application and Extension in the State of New York, 24
FORDHAM L. REv. 204, 204 (1955).
125. See Lester W. Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10
MiNN. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1925); Lindsey R. Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability
to Persons Other than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134, 135
(1938). In a more recent article on the origins of enterprise liability, George
[Vol. 35:3
November 2001] CORPORATE LLBILITYAND IDENTITY 25
established by MacPherson was "not uniform," noting that "[r]ecent
decisions in Massachusetts have enforced the requirement of priv-
ity.' 126 Even Warren Seavey in his effusive assessment of Cardozo's
contribution to tort law published in 1939, conceded that "[fit would
not be true to state that the case has been universally followed."'
127
Seavey concluded, however, that "there is little doubt of the ultimate
complete acceptance of Cardozo's viewpoint."' 28 Time proved Sea-
vey prescient. By 1960, William Prosser could assert that "[d]uring
the suceeding [sic] years this decision [MacPherson] swept the coun-
try, and with the barely possible but highly unlikely exceptions of
Mississippi and Virginia, no American jurisdiction now refuses to
accept it.'
29
B. The Case
In 1910, Donald MacPherson, a stone cutter from Galway Vil-
lage, a small town in upstate New York, traveled about seventeen
miles to the city of Schenectady where he purchased a Buick Model
10 runabout from Close Brothers, a local automobile dealership.
130
The car, one of Buick's best selling modestly priced models, had a
front seat for two and a rumble seat for one on the box behind.
131
The car was rated to go fifty miles per hour.132 MacPherson used the
car during the summer and fall of 1910 without incident. He next
used it in May 1911, and intermittently thereafter until July 25, 1911.
On that day, MacPherson agreed to take a sick neighbor and his
brother to the hospital in Saratoga Springs. 133  Just outside of
Priest argues that "the subject of manufacturer or retailer liability for defective
products was of minor scholarly significance during the 1930s and 1940s."
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 482
(1985).
126. BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, LL.D., THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 78 (1924).
127. Seavey, supra note 86, at 379.
128. Id.
129. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 106, at 1100.
130. The basic factual details are drawn from the lower court opinion,
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 138 N.Y.S. 224, 224-25 (N.Y. App. Div.
1912). Additional details may be found in DAVID W. PECK, DECISION AT LAW
38-69 (1961).
131. See MacPherson, 138 N.Y.S. at 225.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 225-26.
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Saratoga Springs the car suddenly collapsed. 134 MacPherson was
thrown out of the car and injured. It was later determined at trial that
the collapse was caused by a defective rear wheel, made of poor
quality hickory wood that had splintered into fragments.
135
MacPherson hired Edgar Brackett to sue Buick for the harm
caused by the defective automobile.' 36 Brackett was a very promi-
nent and powerful local lawyer who was also the state senator from
the district.' 37 For its part, Buick thought the case important enough
to send a lawyer from Detroit to try the case.1 38 The company also
expended considerable amounts of money and effort to bring in rep-
resentatives from auto and wheel makers from all over the country to
testify as experts. 139 The jury brought in a verdict for MacPherson in
the amount of $5,025.140 The Appellate Division affirmed the
judgement in 1914,141 and the case reached the Court of Appeals in
1916.142
By 1909, Buick was becoming a major player in the emerging
automobile industry under the dynamic, if sometimes erratic, leader-
ship of William Durant. 143 Like many leaders in the new business of
motor car production, Durant first worked at making carriages.
44
After a couple of abortive attempts to manufacture motor cars, Du-
rant took over the small Buick Motor Company in 1904. 14' Durant's
genius for business lay less in solving the technical problems of
automobile manufacturing than in organizing production and
134. See id. at 226.
135. See id.
136. See PECK, supra note 130, at 43.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 46.
139. See KAUFMAN, supra note 81, at 270; PECK, supra note 130, at 46-49.
140. See KAUFMAN, supra note 81, at 270.
141. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 145 N.Y.S. 462 (N.Y. App. Div.
1914).
142. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
143. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 114-18 (1962);
ARTHUR POUND, THE TURNING WHEEL: THE STORY OF GENERAL MOTORS
THROUGH TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 1908-1933, at 80-90 (1934); BERNARD A.
WEISENBERGER, THE DREAM MAKER: WILLIAM C. DURANT, FOUNDER OF
GENERAL MOTORS 83-116 (1979).
144. See CHANDLER, supra note 143, at 116.
145. See id. at 116-17; POUND, supra note 143, at 77-80.
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distribution. 146 He centralized production of the diverse components
of the automobile near the main Buick factory in Flint, Michigan. 1
47
Durant integrated into his organization businesses developed during
the previous decade with Dallas Dort.14 8 The Durant-Dort family of
companies included the old Durant-Dort carriage works, the Flint
Varnish Works, the Flint Axle Works, and the Imperial Wheel Com-
pany. 149 Durant also convinced Charles Stuart Mott to move his
axle-making company to Flint to insure a steady supply of these im-
portant components. 150 As he was centralizing access to supplies,
Durant also worked hard to develop a national distributing and deal-
ership organization.'
Under Durant's guidance, Buick grew rapidly. As Alfred Chan-
dler has noted, "Durant's energy and creative ability were reflected
in Buick's output. In 1903, the company produced 16 cars and in
1904, 31; but in 1906 it made 2,295 and in 1908, 8,487. In four
years, Buick became the leading automobile producer in the United
States."152 In 1908, Durant instigated the formation of the General
Motors Corporation, which soon took over Buick.153 Buick contin-
ued to grow, and leading the way was its popular Model 10 that
started the company on the heaviest production it had yet known.
154
In 1909, the company produced 14,606 cars-half of them Model
10s which sold for $900 each. 155 By this time, Buick had "a reputa-
tion with the public which made it a tower of strength.' 156 The fol-
lowing year, Buick would sell approximately ten thousand 1910
Model 10 runabouts, about one-third of its total production. 157 Buick
did not manufacture its cars from the ground up. Rather, for many
146. See CHANDLER, supra note 143, at 118.
147. See id. at 117.
148. See id.
149. See POUND, supra note 143, at 82.
150. See CHANDLER, supra note 143, at 118.
151. See id. at 117-18; POUND, supra note 143, at 80-82; WEISENBERGER,
supra note 143, at 50-52, 100-106.
152. CHANDLER, supra note 143, at 118.
153. Seeid. at ll9.
154. See POUND, supra note 143, at 89-90.
155. See ED CRAY, CHROME COLOSSUS: GENERAL MOTORS AND ITS TIMES
90 (1980).
156. POUND, supra note 143, at 90.
157. See CRAY, supra note 155.
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important component parts, it relied on suppliers such as Mott's axle
works and the Durant-Dort companies. 158 The latter, through Impe-
rial Wheel, supplied many of the wheels for the Buick Model 10s.
159
One of these cars was purchased by Donald MacPherson.
By the time MacPherson went to Close Brothers for his Model
10 Buick, cars were entering the American scene as standard means
of transportation. As Ed Cray notes, "[p]urchasers no longer bought
automobiles as mechanical curiosities; they presumed their reliabil-
ity.' 160 This "presumed reliability" was, in large part, a function of
brand name recognition fostered by the sort of public relations and
advertising described by Marchand.16 ' It would come to play a criti-
cal role in shaping Cardozo's attack on the citadel of privity as he es-
tablished Buick's liability to MacPherson for the harm caused by the
defective wheel on the car it had produced in distant Michigan.
C. Cardozo's Decision
As mentioned above, Cardozo held Buick liable to MacPherson
on the grounds that an automobile rated to go fifty miles an hour be-
comes a thing of danger if negligently made. 162 The jury found such
negligence, thus, MacPherson had a legitimate legal claim in tort.
163
Central to Cardozo's holding were the ideas of foreseeability and in-
spection. 164 Thus, he asserted that "[i]f [the manufacturer] is negli-
gent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow."'
165
Buick knew that the car was to be used by persons other than the
buyer: first, because Close Brothers was a dealer in cars; and sec-
ond, because the car itself was constructed to hold at least three peo-
ple. 166  Therefore, the injury to a subsequent purchaser such as
MacPherson was reasonably foreseeable. 167 Cardozo also called at-
tention to the fact that the wheel's "defects could have been
158. See CHANDLER, supra note 143, at 117-18.
159. See MacPherson, 138 N.Y.S. at 225.
160. CRAY, supra note 155, at 119.
161. See MARCHAND, supra note 59, at 7-47.
162. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
163. See id. at 1054-55.
164. See id. at 1053.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1053-54.
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discovered by reasonable inspection 168 and additionally, that the
goods would probably be used by the ultimate purchaser "before a
reasonable opportunity for discovering any defect which might ex-
ist."' 169 Thus, in addition to knowledge that the product would be
used by such a person as the plaintiff, knowledge of the defect itself
had to be imputed to Buick through the idea of inspection. More-
over, there is an implication that a reasonable expectation, opportu-
nity, or duty of subsequent inspection on the part of MacPherson
might have insulated Buick from liability. One reason MacPherson's
lack of inspection did not insulate Buick from liability may be in-
ferred from Landes' and Posner's identification of automobiles as
typical "credence" goods, where the complexity of the product con-
fers on the consumer a reasonable basis for relying upon the manu-
facturer to establish its soundness. 170 By 1910, cars in general were
presumed to be reliable and Buick in particular had a strong positive
reputation in the market.
171
168. Id. at 1051.
169. Id. at 1052.
170. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 106, at 284-85.
171. MacPherson sued only Buick but there were at least two other relevant
parties to the accident: Imperial Wheel and Close Brothers. See MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 138 N.Y.S. 224, 224-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912); MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 145 N.Y.S. 462, 462-63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914);
PECK, supra note 130, at 54-55, 62-63; WEISENBERGER, supra note 143, at 96.
Cardozo deliberately bracketed the issue of Imperial Wheel's potential liability
as it was not directly at issue. Nonetheless, in doing so he again pointed out
the importance of inspection, stating that "[t]o make their negligence a cause of
[action]... the manufacturer of the finished product must also fail in his[/her]
duty of inspection." MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. In any event, as a practi-
cal matter, Imperial Wheel was controlled by Durant as well and so suing it
would not likely have implicated any new financial interests. See POUND, su-
pra note 143, at 82. As for Close Brothers, MacPherson was directly in privity
with them and so there was no issue about his ability to sue them. See PECK,
supra note 130, at 54-55, 62-63. But they were a small local concern with
modest resources and so not as fruitful a target of litigation. They, too, how-
ever, could potentially have inspected the wheel. That fact that such a failure
on their part did not insulate Buick from liability also reflects an understanding
both of the complex nature of the product involved and of the distinctive rela-
tionship between the Buick and its cars.
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V. THE LEGAL BIOGRAPHY OF MACPHERSON'S MODEL 10
Tying all these parties together is the object of the car itself, or
rather, two objects: the car and its defective wheel. At times dis-
tinct, and at times functionally identical, these two products of mod-
em industrial manufacture and national commerce provide the basis
for Cardozo's construction of the relationship among the relevant
parties to the action. In tracing the course of wheel and car, Cardozo
implicitly constructs and acts upon a biography of these products. At
each stage in the car's production, marketing, and use, Cardozo situ-
ates it in relation to time, space, and the market in such a way as to
establish the contours of corporate agency, will, and accountabil-
ity.
172
Buick itself consciously created biographies for its products
through advertising and public relations. 173 It represented itself
through its products as a manufacturer of reliable automobiles.
174
Buick's corporate identity was carried out into the marketplace by its
advertisements and products, which, in turn, provided the basis to in-
fluence and inform the consumer. MacPherson's Model 10, thus,
both embodied and asserted Buick's identity in the market. Through
this relationship, the Buick Corporation used its identity to extend its
power and profits. 175 By establishing liability in the absence of priv-
ity, Cardozo effectively turned Buick's identity-its presence in the
market and in society through its products-back upon the corpora-
tion. His opinion enabled, mediated, and shaped a situation whereby
the consumer was able to recharacterize the product as "defective"
and, hence, impose a new identity upon the corporation as "negli-
,,176gent. The product here acts as a sort of nexus of communication
and influence between consumer and corporation. Just as Buick pro-
jected a favorable image of itself outward to the consumer through
its product, Cardozo's opinion allowed the consumer to use that
172. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053-55.
173. See WEISENBERGER, supra note 143, at 100, 105, 109-10.
174. See MARCHAND, supra note 58, at 131; WEISENBERGER, supra note
143, at 105.
175. See CRAY, supra note 155, at 90; WEISENBERGER, supra note 143, at
105, 109-10.
176. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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same product as a means to reimpose a different image or identity
back upon the corporation.
It is important to note here that the issue was not one of the
truthfulness or accuracy of the representations made by Buick. This
was not a case of fraud or warranty. It was not a contest over the
meaning of Buick's representations. Rather, it was a contest over the
meaning of the product, and, thus of the corporation itself. In the
context of product liability law, then, representation becomes a two-
way street: it enables corporate influence over the consumer through
the sort of public relations and advertising described by Marchand,
177
but it also opens the door to liability, which allows the consumer to
impose a new identity back upon the corporation through its product.
Product liability constructs Buick as "present" in its products in a
manner such that harm caused by a defective automobile is deemed
caused by Buick itself. Focusing on the legal biography of a material
object, such as the Buick Model 10, enables us to concretize other-
wise fairly abstract conceptions of, and arguments about, such doc-
trines as "duty" and "causation."
178
In his essay, The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditiza-
tion As Process,179 Igor Kopytoff examines the production of com-
modities as a "cultural and cognitive process," noting that "com-
modities must not only be produced materially as things, but also
culturally marked as being a certain kind of thing."'180 He goes on to
argue that the status of "commodity" is variable over time and
space. 18' Commoditization is a process whereby a thing may enter,
exit, and reenter that category of commodity depending on a range of
factors. 182 Moreover, Kopytoff notes that the category "commodity"
itself is not monolithic. 183 Across time and culture there may be
177. See, e.g., MARCHAND, supra note 58.
178. Characterizations of the product may reflect and enact underlying as-
sumptions about such doctrines but they do so in a particularized fashion that
facilitates their location in a historical and social context.
179. Igor Kopytoff, The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization As
Process, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 64-91 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986).
180. Id. at 64.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 65-69.
183. See id. at65-70.
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various "types" of commodities each assigned to distinct subclassifi-
cations. 184 Hence, commodities have biographies-stories of their
changing status and identity.18 5 "In doing the biography of a thing,"
Kopytoff writes,
[O]ne would ask questions similar to those one asks
about people: What, sociologically, are the biographical
possibilities inherent in its 'status' and in the period and
culture, and how are these possibilities realized? Where
does the thing come from and who made it? What has been
its career so far, and what do people consider to be an ideal
career for such things? What are the recognized "ages" or
periods in the thing's "life", and what are the cultural mark-
ers for them? How does the thing's use change with its age,
and what happens to it when it reaches the end of its useful-
ness?'86
Kopytoff continues, noting that any given object may have multiple
biographies. 187  Thus, a car, his felicitous example, may have a
physical biography; a technical biography, such as its repair record;
an economic biography, such as its changing value; and several pos-
sible social biographies, such as its relation to the owner-family's
economy, impact on family structure, relation to class structure,
etc.' 8 8  For Kopytoff, what makes any biography "culturally in-
formed" involves looking at the object "as a culturally constructed
entity, endowed with culturally specific meanings, and classified and
reclassified into culturally constituted categories."'
89
I wish to ask similar questions to develop a culturally informed
"legal biography" of Donald MacPherson's Model 10 Buick. But
where Kopytoff explored how a thing enters and exits categories of
"commodity," I will examine how a commodity enters and exits
categories that establish a basis for legal liability when it causes
harm. MacPherson contains within it various biographies of the of-
fending automobile. Cardozo's opinion implicitly endows the car
184. See id. at 66.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 66-67.
187. See id. at 68.
188. See id. at 67.
189. Id. at 68.
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with specific meanings at different points in its biography that result
in its being classified and reclassified into powerful legal categories.
The car takes on a different status or identity at different stages of its
career. Throughout, its character is shaped by its encounters with the
relevant parties. From a generic mass-produced car---one of thou-
sands-it eventually becomes a distinctive, singular cause of harm.
In MacPherson, as the car's identity develops, it, in turn, reflects
back upon and ultimately imposes upon its corporate producer,
Buick, the legal identity of a liable party. In particular, I will explore
how the car became a distinctive "conductor of liability"--an item
through which the consumer was able to impose a legal burden upon
a distant corporation; or, alternatively, an item sufficiently imbued
with Buick's corporate identity at the moment it caused harm so as to
sustain a claim that Buick, in effect, harmed MacPherson.
MacPherson's Buick went through several stages of identifica-
tion. Each stage did not necessarily supplant the previous one but
rather was layered upon it, eventually resulting in a thickly identified
object with complex legal implications for diverse parties. These
stages include: its initial creation as a physical thing; its introduction
into the stream of commerce as a commodity; its purchase by Close
Brothers as an item for resale; its purchase by MacPherson, marking
it as "his" car, distinct from all others; its collapse, causing harm to
MacPherson, which revealed it to be a "defective" product; the sub-
sequent reinterpretation of its production, marking it as a "negli-
gently made" product (which was in part a function of its related
definition as an adequately "inspected" product); the definition of a
defectively produced car as a "thing of danger"; the further designa-
tion of the car as a negligently made thing of danger that the manu-
facturer "knew" was going to be used by persons other than the im-
mediate purchaser; and the final definition of the car layered with all
these prior identities as a product that was sufficiently "identified"
with its manufacturer to enable MacPherson to hold Buick liable for
the injuries he suffered as a result of the car's collapse. By looking
at how Cardozo constructs and employs such categories or classifica-
tions, we can get a fuller sense of the cultural and legal dynamics
through which the "citadel of privity" was overthrown and corpora-
tions began to be held accountable to consumers.
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In the beginning was the wheel. Imperial Wheel Company, a
one-time maker of carriage wheels had moved with the times into the
manufacture of automobile wheels. 190 In the early twentieth century,
wheel making was still considered to be such a specialty, requiring
distinctive skills and knowledge, that it remained largely separate
from the overall manufacturing process of the major automobile
companies.191 As noted above, Imperial Wheel was closely related
to Buick through the person of William Durant. 192 It supplied Buick
with wheels for its cars, including the Model 10 that MacPherson
purchased. 93 The wheels were made of hickory. 194 The wheel that
ultimately splintered causing MacPherson's accident began its "life"
as one of some 500,000 wheels furnished to Buick up to that point. 95
None had previously proven defective. 19 6 Thus, at the outset, the
wheel had the "identity" of an Imperial wheel, a proven product, fur-
nished by a reputable manufacturer. 1
97
In constructing the legal biography of MacPherson's car, we
must confront the threshold issue of the relation of the wheel to the
car. Legally, was the wheel incorporated into the car, becoming
merely a component part of Buick Corporation's Model 10; or did it
remain an Imperial wheel, with a distinct legal identity and, hence,
distinct implications for legal liability? Cardozo answers yes and
maybe, respectively. 98 First, Cardozo clearly states that Buick, "was
not merely a dealer in automobiles. It was a manufacturer of auto-
mobiles .... It was responsible for the finished product."'199 In Car-
dozo's story, the wheel becomes Buick's responsibility legally be-
cause Buick was the one who put the components together into the
"finished product.1200 The wheel took on the identity of the Model
190. See PECK, supra note 130, at 47.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., WEISENBERGER, supra note 143, at 50-51, 162.
193. See PECK, supra note 130, at 47.
194. See id. at 49.
195. See id. at 52.
196. See id. at 49-50.
197. See id. at 47.
198. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 1053, 1055.
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10 into which it was incorporated. No longer simply an Imperial
wheel, it became part of a Buick.
The automobile's identity as a Buick, however, did not erase the
presence of Imperial in the wheel. Rather, "Buick" was a new iden-
tity layered over the old that might obscure it for some purposes but
not others. As a basic commodity, the identity of the wheel as dis-
tinctly attributable to Imperial was apparently irrelevant both to
Close Brothers and to MacPherson. They bought a Buick automo-
bile in reliance on Buick's name and reputation. Cardozo recog-
nizes, however, that once the commodity became a thing, a danger
that caused harm to someone, the layered identity of the wheel be-
came newly salient.20' In assigning responsibility for the harm, the
identity of the automobile as a Buick could be disaggregated into its
original component parts.20 2 Cardozo initially brackets the issue by
stating that the court was not required to "go back [to] the manufac-
turer of the finished product and hold the manufacturers of the com-
ponent parts [liable]. 20 3 Nonetheless, Cardozo considers the possi-
bility, noting that to find Imperial's negligence "a cause of imminent
danger.., the manufacturer of the finished product must also fail in
his duty of inspection. 2 °4
Implicit in Cardozo's discussion of Imperial's potential liability
is a complex understanding of how the legal biographies of the wheel
and the car intertwined and informed one another.20 5 Upon its crea-
tion, the wheel was a generic commodity, merely one of thousands
provided to Buick for incorporation into its cars. Its identity as an
Imperial wheel was relevant to Buick because Imperial was a "repu-
table manufacturer" of automobile wheels.207 Buick incorporated the
wheel into a Model 10, a larger common commodity, one of thou-
sands made that year.208 When sold to Close Brothers and resold to
MacPherson, the wheel mattered primarily as component of a Buick
Model 10. But when the wheel splintered, resulting in the collapse
201. See id. at 1053.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1055.
206. See PECK, supra note 130, at 52.
207. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055.
208. See PECK, supra note 130, at 52.
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of the Model 10 and injury to MacPherson, the wheel and the car
both exited the category of common commodity and became singu-
larized objects imbued with special legal significance. No longer
mere commodities on the market, they were now distinct "defective
products" that had caused injury. First, Cardozo asserted that the
wheel's identity as an "Imperial" wheel would have legal signifi-
cance only if it could be further classified as an "uninspected"
wheel.20 9 This implies first, that if Buick had reasonably exercised
its duty of inspection and found no defect, then the wheel would en-
ter the category of either: (a) a nondefective wheel that nonetheless
somehow caused an accident (and since Cardozo was not advancing
a theory of strict liability here, Buick, presumably would not be held
liable in such a case); or (b) a defective wheel for which Buick could
not be held liable but that Imperial might.21° Second, Cardozo's as-
sertion implies that if Buick failed adequately to inspect the wheel,
then it became lodged in two categories of legal import: part of a de-
fective Buick Model 10, and a defective Imperial wheel. The Model
10 could only be defective if the wheel were defective. But, if Buick
exercised its duty of inspection, a defective Imperial wheel need not
necessarily make the Model 10 defective. Depending on circum-
stance, particularly on Cardozo's construction of the "duty" to in-
spect, the various identities of the things at issue might be either en-
twined or distinguished.21'
After leaving the assembly plant in Flint, MacPherson's Model
10 was sold to Close Brothers. 212 Close Brothers' identity as a car
dealership bore directly on Cardozo's construction of Buick's liabil-
213Toetbihsc ' foudity beyond privity. To establish such liability, Cardozo focused on
the foreseeability of the injury.2 14 For the harm to MacPherson to be
foreseeable, Buick had to know that the Model 10 would be used by
persons other than the purchaser.215 Cardozo constructively estab-
lished such knowledge in two ways. First, because Buick knew that
209. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053, 1055.
210. See id. at 1053.
211. See id. at 1053.
212. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 138 N.Y.S. 224, 224-25 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1912).
213. See id.
214. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053-54.
215. See id. at 1053.
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Close Brothers was a dealer, it could be charged with knowledge that
the car would be used by persons other than the immediate buyer.
216
That is, upon sale to Close Brothers, the common commodity Buick
Model 10 took on the additional identity of a "commodity for re-
sale." Second, the design of the product itself, by including seating
for up to three, designated it as a car for use by more than one per-
son.
2 17
When MacPherson purchased the car, he bought it as a Buick
Model 10-one of the most popular automobiles of the day made by
one of the best known corporations.2 18 When he took possession it
became his car-MacPherson's Buick. He bought it for use, not re-
sale. At the time, 1910, and place, upstate New York, it may also
have taken on for him the additional identity of what Kopytoff terms
a "prestige" item, holding a status value for him beyond its basic
price. 219 In such case, part of its prestige would derive from Buick's
reputation with the public.220 In this relationship, Buick manufac-
tured not only automobiles but a reputation as well.21 MacPherson
purchased both when he bought the car. As "MacPherson's Buick,"
it was both the singular car, taken out of the stream of commerce for
use by a specific individual, and part of a larger group of common
commodities associated with the Buick Corporation. In a newly ex-
panding national market economy, increasingly permeated with
brand name products, such a dual association became central to mar-
keting strategies whereby distant corporations imparted an attractive
identity--or "soul" as Marchand might say-to their products. 2
The brand name and reputation of Buick took the automobile out of
the realm of a purely generic commodity and imbued it with a dis-
223tinctive identity. In this regard, the logic of advertising implies a
sort of labor theory of value: Through the combined labor of
production, marketing, and advertising a brand name product, the
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See PECK, supra note 130, at 40.
219. See Kopytoff, supra note 179, at 71.
220. See id. at 71.
221. See id. at 73-77.
222. See MARCHAND, supra note 59, at 3-4.
223. See, e.g., KOPYTOFF, supra note 179, at 73-77.
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corporation infused its products with aspects of its own identity.224
The Buick Corporation was "present" in the automobile through its
brand name and reputation. Thus, once the product became a brand
name commodity in the national market, its developing identity im-
plicated the identity of the corporation that produced it. At this
point, the legal biography of the Model 10 begins to reflect back
upon the identity of the Buick Corporation.
When MacPherson's Buick broke down, it became something
new. At trial the jury established, and Cardozo later affirmed, that it
was a defective product. 22 As such, it gained a new type of singu-
larity that set it apart from all other similar products. It was now
"MacPherson's defective Buick," three layers, at least, of relevant
identities for establishing liability. But not all defects may be legally
significant. Cardozo was careful to further identify this particular
defect as one that made the car "a thing of danger."2 16 The next step
in the car's legal biography was the further determination that it was
somehow negligently made.227 This determination provided a criti-
cal link between the car's identity and the identity of the producing
corporation, Buick. As the car became designated as "MacPherson's
negligently made, dangerously defective Buick," it imposed back
upon the Buick corporation the identity of "negligent."
22 8
Inspection and foresight were also critical to imposing the iden-
tity of negligence.229 First, Buick was held liable because it failed in
its duty to adequately inspect MacPherson's car.230 Alternatively
phrased, one might say that MacPherson's car became a basis for
imposing liability upon Buick because of its status as an "inade-
quately inspected defective product." 231 The adequacy of inspection
was determined not simply by some abstract appeal to duty, but by a
concrete examination of the material object, how it was made, how it
manifested itself to the beholder, and how craftsmen skilled in the art
224. See id. at 71.
225. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 1053-54.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 1053.
231. Id.
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would understand what they saw.232 Thus, at trial, extensive testi-
mony was devoted to the nature of hickory wood in general, the par-
ticular defects of the specific hickory used in the wheel that splin-
tered on MacPherson's car, and the types of tests a wheelwright or
car manufacturer might reasonably be expected to employ to uncover
such defects. 233 At trial, the failure of adequate inspection was, in
effect, determined by reasoning back from the material object to
Buick.
234
Second, foresight-or lack thereof-also played a key role in es-
tablishing Buick's identity as negligent.235 Cardozo identifies two
key sites where foresight mattered most: the product itself, and the
market:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then
a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the conse-
quences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is
added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully .... We are
dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the
finished product, who puts it on the market to be used with-
out inspection by his customers. If he is negligent, where
danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow.
236
The "nature" of the product itself gave warning, thereby defining and
imposing the basic duty of foresight.237 Central to Cardozo's con-
struction of this "nature" was his identification of the Model 10 as a
"thing of danger" when negligently made.238 For Cardozo, the intro-
duction of the car into a stream of commerce in a national market
was critical to elaborating the scope and reach of the foresight re-
quired of Buick.239 The extended web of market relations between
232. See id.
233. See MacPherson, 138 N.Y.S. at 226.
234. See PECK, supra note 130, at 47-52.
235. See id. at 53; MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
236. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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Buick, Close Brothers, and MacPherson also shaped the relation be-
tween inspection and foresight.2 40 Cardozo did not expect a retail
purchaser to be in a position to conduct new tests, hence, there was a
heightened burden upon Buick to conduct adequate initial inspec-
tions.241 Then, given Buick's choice to introduce the product into the
market, Cardozo imposed upon the corporation a constructive
knowledge or foresight of the range of individuals who might be-
242come users of its product. The reality of newly evolved, extended
market relations dominated by large and often distant corporations
thereby contextualizes Cardozo's construction of Buick's liability.
As he subsequently notes, "[p]recedents drawn from the days of
travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day."
243
Cardozo was finely sensitive to the need to adapt legal principles
to meet modem conditions. "In the complexities of modem life," he
wrote in 1924, "there is a constantly increasing need for resort by the
judges to some fact-finding agency which will substitute exact
knowledge of factual conditions for conjecture and impression."
244
In MacPherson, the technical complexity of the automobile de-
manded an evaluation of what constituted reasonable inspection by
various experts at trial.245 Cardozo felt that the social and economic
complexity of modem American market relations called upon him to
extend the duties imposed by the technical demands of inspection
beyond privity of contract.246 Thus, as he noted in The Paradoxes of
Legal Science,
When changes of manners or business have brought it about
that a rule of law which corresponded to previously existing
norms or standards of behavior, corresponds no longer to
the present norms or standards, but on the contrary departs
from them, then those same forces or tendencies of devel-
opment that brought the law into adaptation to the old
norms and standards are effective, without legislation, but
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. CARDOZO, supra note 126, at 117.
245. 111 N.E. at 1053, 1055.
246. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 13-14
(1928); see also MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
[Vol. 35:3
November 2001] CORPORATE LIABILITYAND IDEATITY 41
by the inherent energies of the judicial process, to restore
the equilibrium. 247
In upholding the extension of Buick's liability beyond privity of con-
tract, Cardozo could reasonably see his opinion as restoring a sort of
equilibrium that existed in the days of travel by stagecoach but had
since been upset by changes in technology and business.248 Indeed,
as he stated later in the same book, "the judge, if he may not halt the
march of civilization, may do something at times to moderate its
pace, to mitigate its ruthless quality."249
VI. CORPORATE IDENTITY AND CORPORATE LIABILITY
Once the biography of a product that causes harm is elaborated,
it still remains to connect it to a responsible party who may be held
liable. Harm and liability in tort are intimately related to understand-
ings of agency and will.250 Liability requires an act or omission by
an actor that results in harm to another.25' When an object causes
harm, it is not the object that is to blame but the actor who is held re-
sponsible for the object.252 In constructing the relationship of re-
sponsibility between actor and object, the modem law of torts fo-
cuses in particular on the concept of "will., 253 It may be said that the
will of the actor is said to inhabit the object that causes the harm. It
is not the object per se that causes the harm but the actor, through his
or her will as embodied in the object.254 Thus, for example, in The
Common Law, Holmes notes that it would be "unjust" to hold a man
answerable "for having in a fit fallen on a man."2 55 Here we have a
straightforward separation of will from object. We may restate
247. CARDOZO, supra note 246, at 14-15.
248. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
249. CARDOZO, supra note 246, at 58.
250. See WILLIAM L. PROSsER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 682-84 (5th ed.
1984).
251. See id. at 33-39.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. HOLMES, supra note 71, at 46. This example is drawn from a larger
discussion of criminal liability, but it seems to me that the basic principles are
equally applicable in tort. Indeed, Holmes directly relates this discussion to
concepts of choice and foreseeability that also play a significant role in his
later discussion of negligence.
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Holmes' example by saying that the man's body fell on somebody,
but the man himself did not. That is, his will or identity did not in-
habit or impel his body to fall, hence, what fell was a mere physical
object, without identity and hence without a relationship to a person
sufficient to establish liability.
Similar distinctions are evident in the Restatement of Torts
which, as noted above, Cardozo played a significant role in shap-
ing. For example, the Restatement defines the word "act" as "an
external manifestation of the actor's will and does not include any of
its results even the most direct, immediate and intended.",25' A
comment elaborates:
There cannot be an act without volition. Therefore, a con-
traction of a person's muscles which is purely a reaction to
some outside force, such as a knee jerk ... or the convul-
sive movements of an epileptic, are not acts of that person..
• Since some outward manifestation of the defendant's will
is necessary to the existence of an act which can subject
him [or her] to liability, it is not enough to subject a defen-
dant to liability that a third person has utilized a part of his
body as an instrument to carry out his own intention to
cause harm to the plaintiff.
258
Here again, we find a disjunction between body and person. Without
will, the body is merely an "instrument." 259 Moreover, it is an in-
strument that can be imbued with the will of a "third person," that is,
someone other than the person who occupies the body.260 In effect,
"will" carries the "identity" of the actor into the object that causes
harm.261 The object itself has no inherent or essential legal identity
absent a constructed relationship to an "actor," that is, to someone
capable of projecting their identity into the object through the exer-
cise of "will. 262 That negligence often involves an omission or fail-
ure to act does not vitiate the application of these principles to cases
256. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 2 (1934).
257. Id.
258. Id. at § 2 cmt. a.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. at § 2 cmt. b.
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of negligence. 263 Indeed, a failure to act involves a withholding of
one's will from an area where the court determines it should be pre-
264sent. In such a case, the court constructively imbues the object
causing harm with the actor's will.265 The Restatement argues for li-
ability where "[a] manufacturer... fails to exercise reasonable care
in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing
[physical] harm .... ,266 In effect, the Restatement consigns the
manufacturer's identity to travel with such a chattel through the mar-
ket to a distant purchaser who may be harmed by the defect.
2 67
Constructing the "will" of corporate actors was a major concern
of the various theorists who hotly debated the question of corporate
personality during the first third of the twentieth century.268 This
brings us back to Vinogradoffs argument that applying tort law to
corporations implicated ethical and psychological issues that require
the adoption of a real entity theory of corporate personality. 2 9 I.
Maurice Wormser, a vehement critic of corporate irresponsibility,
noted that:
It is sometimes said that "corporations have no soul." If by
the use of this expression is meant that corporations cannot
entertain an intent, the statement is of course erroneous....
If what is meant, however, is that the "group will" of the
corporate person may be very different from the wills and
purposes of the individual associates, then the expression
has real significance. There can be no doubt that men
united into a corporate group will do things corporately and
collectively which individually they would not think of do-
ing . . . . Corporations, unlike individuals, unfortunately
tend to have no moral standards.... [T]here is no denying
263. See id. at § 395 cmt. a.
264. See id.
265. See id. at § 395 cmt. b.
266. Id. at § 395.
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., Machen, supra note 9, at 255-57; Vinogradoff, supra note 9,
at 600-04.
269. See Vinogradoff, supra note 9, at 602.
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that the "group-will" of the corporate person all too fre-
quently is a vicious one ... .270
This invocation of the corporate soul calls to mind Marchand's dis-
cussion of how large corporations increasingly deployed public rela-
tions and advertising campaigns to address precisely the amoral im-
age Wormser presents.27' Wormser's deep concern over the
viciousness of the corporate person derives both from his under-
standing of the structural dynamic of how people act differently
when part of a collective, and from an appreciation of the great
power modem corporations had in shaping social and economic
life.
272
Cardozo, too, addressed the question of corporate will and re-
sponsibility.273 In the 1926 case of Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway
Co., he notably declared that the problem of piercing the veil of cor-
porate identity in the relation between parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions was "enveloped in the mists of metaphor," adding that
"[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as de-
vices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."' 274 Two
years later, Cardozo intoned a similar warning in addressing the
problem of the relation of individual to group will in a manner that
seems to address some of Wormser's concerns:
The individual in the group ... is not the same as the indi-
vidual out of the group. His will has been transfigured by
association with the wills of others. This does not mean
that there is a mystical common will which belongs to the
group as a person separate from its members. All that it
means is that the wills of individuals like their habits and
desires are modified by the interaction between mind and
mind.275
More specifically, with reference to corporate personality, he
observed that:
270. WORMSER, supra note 9, at 100-01.
271. See MARCHAND, supra note 58, at 4, 10.
272. See WORMSER, supra note 9, at 100-01.
273. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926).
274. Id. at61.
275. CARDOZO, supra note 246, at 88.
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The general rule may still be that corporate personality is a
legislative gift rather than a quality inherent in the very na-
ture of a group. It seems, however, that at times even in our
law a group has a solidarity so obvious as to evoke judicial
recognition of its corporate or quasi-corporate existence,
though no charter... has been.., given ... *276
Cardozo had a less fatalistic view of corporate personality than
Wormser 7  He recognized as an empirical matter that individual
will was somehow transformed and remade through association.
27 8
But such association did not inevitably make it irresponsible or vi-
cious.2 79 Nonetheless, will was present in groups (and corporations)
and hence had to be made accountable.
280
In the particularized legal arena of products liability, Cardozo's
opinion in MacPherson constructs Buick's will as sufficiently pre-
sent in its defective products to imbue them with its corporate iden-
tity.281 A defective product thereby provides a conduit through
which an individual consumer may gain the upper hand in defining
corporate identity and managing corporate accountability. In this
case, Cardozo created a means for the consumer to contain and man-
age the corporate power by constructing a relationship between cor-
porations and their products sufficient to sustain claims of liability in
tort.282 MacPherson's Model 10 was far easier to identify, classify,
and manage as a defective product than was the entire Buick Corpo-
ration. Yet, by finding Buick "present" in the Model 10, Cardozo al-
lowed MacPherson to hold the corporation liable through its product.
That is, by characterizing the product, Cardozo characterized the
corporation insofar as it was present in the product in a manner rele-
vant to establishing liability.
276. Id. at 91-92.
277. Not surprisingly, Wormser characterized Cardozo's decision not to
pierce the veil of corporate identity in Berkey to be "lamentable." See
WORMSER, supra note 9, at 104.
278. See CARDOZO, supra note 246, at 88.
279. See id. at 88-93.
280. See id.
281. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916).
282. See id. at 1054-55.
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VII. BUICK'S PRESENCE IN MACPHERSON'S MODEL 10
Buick's identity as "negligent" and, hence, liable, was derived in
important ways through its relation to the material product that
caused the harm-MacPherson's Model 10.283 A closer examination
of some key themes in Cardozo's legal biography of the car will pro-
vide a fuller understanding of the nature of Buick's "presence" in the
product and the dynamic whereby the identities of each came to in-
form the other. Indeed, as I will elaborate below, Cardozo's path-
breaking overthrow of privity can be understood largely in terms of
how he implicitly constructed the corporation's identity as present in
the product to a sufficient degree that when the product caused harm,
the corporation itself could be understood as causing harm.284 That
is, in terms of legal liability, the Model 10 did not harm MacPherson
per se, rather it was Buick as present in the Model 10 that harmed
MacPherson. The Model 10 may be understood as an external mani-
festation of Buick's identity, carrying it through the market both as a
brand name product capable of promoting Buick's reputation and as
a representative conductor of liability. In what might be understood
as a strange twist on the "politics of presence," representation turns
out to be a two-way street and presence becomes a basis not only for
articulating ideas and interests but also for being held accountable for
one's actions. 285 Buick, in fact, was very assiduously trying to deny
or obscure its presence in MacPherson's car; or alternatively, to use
the doctrine of privity to insulate its presence, thereby preventing it
from being used as a conductor of liability.286
I use the term "conductor of liability" quite deliberately because
it calls to mind Oliver Wendell Holmes' characterization of the fic-
tion of corporate personality as a "nonconductor" that protects indi-
vidual shareholders from liability.287 Just as the "veil of corporate
identity" may be used as a shield to protect shareholders, it may also
be used as a sword to hold corporations themselves accountable.288
283. See id. at 1055.
284. See id. at 1053-54.
285. See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 4 (1995).
286. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051, 1053.
287. See Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273
(1908).
288. See Wonser, supra note 36, at 500, 512.
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Far from "piercing the veil" of corporate identity, product liability
plaintiffs need to extend the veil to envelop the defective product.
28 9
Thus, to the degree that a corporation can be legally established as
"present" in a defective product, it may be held liable. In this man-
ner, products liability doctrine lined the contours of corporate per-
sonality by determining how and where corporate identity might be-
come manifest beyond the boundaries of the formal corporate
organization. This was an especially pressing issue in Cardozo's
time as large corporations were rapidly expanding their influence
into multifarious aspects of American society and economy.290 Thus,
Cardozo states, "[w]e are dealing now with the liability of the manu-
facturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used
without inspection by his customers. If he is negligent, where danger
is to be foreseen, liability will follow."'291 In these two sentences
Cardozo succinctly states three factors that are critical to his con-
struction of Buick's identity in the product and its resulting liability:
inspection, foreseeability, and the context of the market.292 Through
inspection Buick becomes "present" in its product, infusing it with
corporate identity in a manner relevant to liability. Through fore-
sight the corporation's identity in the product is carried out to
consumers. The market, in turn, contextualizes foresight and
determines its range and boundaries. Each will now be considered in
detail.
A. Inspection
In his initial characterization of the facts of the MacPherson
case, Cardozo notes that "[t]here is evidence.., that [the wheel's]
defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, and
that inspection was omitted. 2 93 From the outset, then, Cardozo casts
the defendant's duty in terms of inspection.294 Just what, however,
did inspection entail and why was it so important to establishing li-
ability? In distinguishing a previous case involving an exploding
steam boiler where the court refused to extend liability beyond
289. See id.
290. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 69-70.
291. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
292. See id.
293. Id. at 1051.
294. See id.
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privity,295 Cardozo noted that, "[t]he manufacturer knew that his own
test was not the final one. The finality of the test has a bearing on
the measure of diligence owing to persons other than the pur-
chaser.,
296
The duty of inspection runs, in part, with the identity of the party
in its relation to the relevant product. Thus, Cardozo concludes:
We think the defendant was not absolved from a duty of in-
spection because it bought the wheels from a reputable
manufacturer. It was not merely a dealer in automobiles. It
was a manufacturer of automobiles. It was responsible for
the finished product. It was not at liberty to put the finished
product on the market without subjecting the component
parts to ordinary and simple tests.
297
In these few lines, Cardozo implicates the duties of all parties
who had relevant relations to the defective product. The "reputable
manufacturer" of the wheel may have a duty of inspection but it does
not supersede, or "absolve" Buick of an independent duty to in-
spect.2 98 This duty derives not merely from the fact that the wheel
passed through Buick's hands but because it used the wheel in a par-
ticular fashion and for a particular purpose.299 Through its labor-or
rather the labor of its employees-Buick transformed the wheel into
something new by incorporating it into a Model 10. Taking a
Lockean approach to Cardozo's reasoning, we can say that in the act
of manufacture, Buick effectively imbued the wheel with its identity
through its labor. The presence of Buick's identity in the product
provided the basis for imposing the duty of inspection which derived,
in large part, from Buick's purpose of introducing the car into the
market.30 0 This duty stands in marked contrast to the duty of the
"mere dealer" in automobiles, who in no way transformed the prod-
uct and encountered the car only after it had been introduced into the
295. See Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
296. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916) (ci-
tations omitted).
297. Id. at 1055 (citing Richmond & Danville R.R. Co. v. Elliot, 149 U.S.
266, 272 (1892)).
298. See id.
299. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 138 N.Y.S. 224, 229 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1912).
300. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055.
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stream of commerce, and so bore only a minimal duty of inspec-
tion.
301
Testing, a form of inspection, changes the character both of the
inspected object and of the inspector. When an object enters the
category of "inspected object" in its legal biography, it ceases to be a
conductor of liability, provided the inspection was adequate accord-
ing to prevailing norms of reasonable behavior within the relevant
industry.30 2 Moreover, even an uninspected object may cease to be a
conductor of liability provided that it is reasonably expected to be
subject to subsequent inspection.0 3 Thus, the reasonable expectation,
or fact, of subsequent inspection may also serve to render the object
a nonconductor of liability.
Connecting these concepts back to the Restatement's definition
of an "act",304 we may understand inspection as an act of will that in-
fused the product with the identity "inspected by Buick." Failure to
inspect in a timely manner entailed an absence of will where society
determined it should be present. 305 In such a case, will was imputed
to the obliged party such that its identity constructively infused the
product.30 6  Thus, the Model 10 was inadequately inspected by
Buick.307 Buick's failure to inspect opened the door to the designa-
tion of "defective product" which in turn allowed for the imposition
of liability upon Buick through the constructive presence of its iden-
tity in the defective product.3 8 At each stage, inspection played a
critical role in defining the identity of the parties in their relation to
the defective product.
30 9
Timely inspection was a type of nonconductor. It occluded past
identities. That is, if an inspected wheel caused harm, it could not be
classified as "defective" in a manner for which Buick could be held
301. See id.
302. See MacPherson, 138 N.Y.S. at 230.
303. See Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965).
305. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055.
306. See id. at 1052.
307. See id. at 1055.
308. See id. at 1053.
309. See id.
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responsible.31 ° Thus, if Buick had adequately inspected the wheel on
MacPherson's Model 10, then when it fragmented, it would not be
Buick's responsibility any more than if an epileptic hit someone with
her hand during a seizure. Just as the epileptic's identity may be dis-
tinguished from her flailing hand, so too Buick's identity would be
distinguished from its fragmenting wheel. In this scenario, inspec-
tion withdrew or insulated Buick's identity in the object. Its "will"
and, hence, its identity would no more inform the defective wheel
than would the epileptic's inform her flailing hand during a seizure.
Opportunity and skill play critical roles in Cardozo's construc-
tion of power of inspection to fix the identity both of an object and of
the inspecting party. Thus, in discussing the case of Heaven v. Pen-
der,311 Cardozo focused on the court's assertion that central to ex-
tending privity was the fact that "the goods 'would in all probability
be used at once.., before a reasonable opportunity for discovering
any defect which might exist .... ",,3 Cardozo continued, noting
that the Heaven court implied a duty when "the thing supplied is of
such a nature 'that [the user's want of] skill as to its condition...
would probably cause danger to the person. .... ,,313 An automobile
is by its nature technically complex and while MacPherson had quite
enough time to inspect his car, he did not have the technical know-
how. Moreover, the Model 10 was a mass-produced commodity, in-
troduced into the stream of commerce with the support of the best
marketing and advertising strategies Will Durant could devise. As
Cardozo later notes, under such circumstances "[t]he manufacturer
who sells [an] automobile to the [retailer] invites the dealer's cus-
tomers to use it.', 314 The product carried the corporation's "voice"--
a powerful sign of identity-out into the market, inviting consumers
to buy and use the particular car distinctively marked as a "Buick."
The invitation is not merely one for use but also for reliance upon the
quality of the product evidenced by its brand name. The context of
310. See MacPherson, 138 N.Y.S. at 230.
311. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (extending liability to a dock owner who put up
defective staging outside a ship that injured the workers of the ship owner for
whom it was built).
312. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052 (quoting Heaven, 11 Q.B.D. at 510).
313. Id. at 1052 (quoting Heaven, 11 Q.B.D. at 510).
314. Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
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the national market was central to determining the peculiar power of
inspection to fix identity. Cardozo carefully noted that "[w]e are
dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished
product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by
his customers." 315 Cardozo's construction of Buick's invitation to
remote consumers for use without inspection makes sense only in the
context of understanding the automobile as a technically complex
"credence" good introduced into the stream of a complex national
market through sophisticated marketing and advertising techniques.
As noted above, Landes and Posner connect the rise of products
liability to the increasing complexity both of manufactured products
and the web of market networks through which they were distrib-
uted.316 The technical complexity of commodities, such as automo-
biles, reduced expectations that the consumer would have adequate
317time or expertise to inspect such products. The social and eco-
nomic complexity of extensive national markets attenuated the rela-
tion between producer and consumer and, so, increased expectations
that the consumer could rely on-or, in Landes and Posner's term,
give "credence" to--the manufacturer's reasonable inspection of
items offered for sale and resale.
318
Consumer reliance was constructed largely through the burgeon-
ing profession of advertising. 319 More than merely presenting brand
names to the public, advertising created powerful associations, im-
ages, and stories that imbued commodities with mystery and won-
der.320 Jackson Lears, in his cultural history of advertising, notes a
shift occurring around the time of MacPherson, in which advertisers
shifted from a more plain-spoken tradition of presenting basic facts
about products to focusing more on image and fantasy.321 "Automo-
bile advertising," he states:
[W]as a case in point .... [T]his plainspoken view was
soon pass6, except among the manufacturers themselves.
315. Id. at 1053.
316. See LANDES & PONSER, supra note 106, at 284-88.
317. See id. at 284-85.
318. See id. at 284-87.
319. See LEARS, supra note 58, at 201-18.
320. See id. at 210-18.
321. See id. at 196-98.
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Among advertising people, the Chalmers and Pierce-Arrow
automobile companies were soon being celebrated for
"word painting the auto's seductive joys" and soft-pedaling
any emphasis on 'mechanical excellence."' The triumph of
"atmosphere" in automobile advertising involved the incor-
poration of fantasy into the emerging distribution system..
322
In this world of production and advertising, concern for "mechanical
excellence" remained the province of the manufacturer.323 Knowl-
edge and inspection of the technical function of the product were
consigned to this province and hence became the manufacturer's re-
sponsibility.324 The consumer, on the other hand, encountered the
product through the seductive "word-painting" and fantastic associa-
tions. In the new distribution system described by Lears, the con-
sumer was not called upon to inspect a product for technical qual-
ity-that was the producer's job.325 In the emerging advertising-
driven national market, the producers themselves were invoking fan-
tasy to market their products to consumers, calling upon their feel-
ings and impressions, not their technical powers of inspection.326 In
this context, Cardozo, with his sensitivity to the demands of "modem
conditions," could reasonably find that MacPherson had neither the
opportunity, ability, nor responsibility to inspect the car.
327
It is in this context that no duty or expectation of inspection was
placed on the consumer. Hence, the identity of "inspector" with its
attendant legal responsibilities, remained fixed on Buick alone.
Thus, when MacPherson's Model 10 became a defective, negligently
manufactured (i.e., inadequately inspected) good, Buick's identity as
inspector connected it to the automobile in a manner sufficient to
make it legally responsible for foreseeable harm caused by the de-
feet.328 The concept of foreseeability thus becomes a critical adjunct
and modifier to the duty of inspection.
322. Id. at 212-13 (citations omitted).
323. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
324. See id. at 1055.
325. See LEARS, supra note 58.
326. See id. at 215-17.
327. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
328. See id. at 1053.
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B. Foreseeability
Where inspection is an act of will through which the corporation
imbues a product with identity, foreseeability is a principle which
regulates how that identity is understood to travel out into society
and through the market. Let us return to some central language in
Cardozo's opinion:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then
a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the conse-
quences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is
added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully. That is as far as
we are required to go for the decision in this case.
32 9
Foresight first comes into play in the act of production itself.
"Reasonable certainty" about the danger of a defective product re-
quires foresight into its possible impact on users.330 In this case, the
"nature"--apparently common sense understanding-of the thing it-
self provides the basis for imputing foresight to Buick.331 At this
early stage in the biography of the car, foresight carries Buick's iden-
tity as manufacturer of the car into an object that has now become "a
thing of danger., 332 Absent a reasonable expectation of foresight of
danger, the defective car would not carry Buick's identity with it. Or
rather, the car would remain a Buick, but that part of its subsequent
identity that marked it as defective-after the accident-would not
be traceable back to Buick. Foresight here becomes a vector that
carries Buick's identity outward along the trajectory traced by the
car's legal biography.
The next stage of foresight involves knowledge that the car "will
be used by persons other than the purchaser." 333 At this point, fore-
sight carries the corporation's identity in the product beyond privity
of contract out into society and the market. Buick's presence in
329. Id.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. Id.
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MacPherson's Model 10 extends as far as one could reasonably fore-
see that the car might be used. Beyond this range of foresight, the
car, even if negligently made, would not carry Buick's identity. If it
caused harm beyond the realm of foresight, it would no longer be
animated by Buick's will and hence the injury could not be attribut-
able to the corporation. 334 The spatial sense that Buick's identity and
liability are somehow traveling outward with the automobile is rein-
forced by Cardozo's bracketing of his inquiry with the words, "[t]hat
is as far as we are required to go ....
The vector of foreseeability may be interrupted by a subsequent
duty of inspection.336 Thus, if Cardozo had found it incumbent upon
either Close Brothers or MacPherson himself to inspect the article,
then Buick would have been absolved of liability. 337 Buick's fore-
sight, in other words, was constructed to extend only so far as the
next duty of inspection. Cardozo, however, constructs duties of in-
spection and foresight quite differently. Where inspection is deter-
mined in relation to expert knowledge and skill, foresight is deter-
mined more generally in relation to community norms of what a
reasonable person would be expected to anticipate in a given situa-
tion.338 Again employing the analogy of vectors, one might say that
expertise is the vector through which Buick's identity enters the
Model 10, but community norms are the vector that carries Buick's
identity out into a relation with people in society that is capable of
sustaining a basis for legal liability. The appeal to community stan-
dards for setting the bounds of foreseeability accords well with Car-
dozo's view of the role of judges as the "interpreters of the 'social
mind."', 339 It also provided the basis for asserting local norms of ap-
propriate conduct into the market. Cardozo's use of foreseeability as
a regulative principle in products liability thereby facilitated the im-
position of community based nonmarket values over America's rap-
idly nationalizing corporate capitalist markets.
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. See id. at 1054-55.
337. See id. at 1055.
338. See id. at 1052-53.
339. CARDOZO, supra note 246, at 49.
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The appeal to community standards also echoes Holmes' earlier
characterization of foresight as concerning "what a man of reason-
able prudence would have foreseen." 340 Later considering the condi-
tions under which it would be appropriate to hold a man liable for
negligence, Holmes asserted that, "they must be such as would have
led a prudent man to perceive the danger, although not necessarily to
foresee the specific harm. But this is a vague test. How is it to be
decided what those circumstances are? The answer must be experi-
ence." 341 Heconcludes that, "as the teachings of experience are mat-
ters of fact, it is easy to see why the jury should be consulted with
regard to them. 342  Similarly, as Kaufmaan notes of Cardozo,
"[f]oreseeability, not as an abstract notion but in the context of a fac-
tual setting, was crucial to [his] idea of the duty of care that underlay
liability for negligence. 343 It was, then, peculiarly the province of
the local community to determine the nature and limits of fore-
sight.3 " In the context of early twentieth century products liability,
this approach lodged in the locality a countervailing power to man-
age at least a small portion of a market economy that was increas-
ingly dominated by large, distant, national corporations.
345
Morton Horwitz contrasts the emergence of foreseeability as a
regulative principle in tort against "late-nineteenth-centr, efforts to
construct a system of private law free from the dangers of redistribu-
tion .. . [based on] the idea of objective causation." 346  Frances
Wharton, in particular, saw a great threat of potential redistribution
emerging from the doctrine of foreseeability, particularly in tort.
347
Horwitz quotes him at length:
"The consequence" of any foreseeability test... "would be
that the capitalist would be obliged to bear the burden, not
merely of his own want of caution, but of the want of cau-
tion of all who should be concerned in whatever he should
produce." If courts could argue that intervening causes of
340. HOLMES, supra note 71, at 45.
341. Id. at 87-88.
342. Id. at 101.
343. KAUFMAN, supra note 81, at 311.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 51.
347. See id. at 54-59.
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an injury were foreseeable, the result "would be traced back
until a capitalist is reached ... 348
This was, indeed, what Cardozo allowed MacPherson to do. In his
hands, foreseeability became a doctrine in tort through which an in-
dividual consumer was able to "reach" distant corporations and exert
considerable influence over their practices. Or rather, to put it an-
other way, foreseeability carried the corporation's identity out into
the market through its product to a point where consumers could then
reach back to the corporation through the product.
C. The Market
At several points throughout his opinion, Cardozo emphasized
the context of market relations as a basis for assessing Buick's liabil-
ity.349 Market relations conditioned the duty of adequate inspection
and framed the scope of appropriate foresight."' Buick's "invita-
tion" to third parties to use its products was carried forward through
the channels of commerce. The market carried the corporation's
"voice" to the consumer, both through the product as it passed from
one party to another and through advertisements that suffused all so-
ciety. The critical act in establishing Buick's liability beyond privity
was not the manufacture of the car but the corporation's choice to in-
troduce the car into the stream of commerce. 35 1 The market, in turn,
defined the limits of foresight attributable to Buick. Buick's knowl-
edge of who was likely to use the product was defined in terms of
common understanding of the flow of a commodity through channels
of commerce in the emerging national market economy.
352
Buick's identity traveled with the Model 10 so long as it re-
tained its complementary identity as a market-based commodity. One
might hypothesize that if the automobile entered some other sphere
of social relations, for example, as a display in a historical exhibit or
as the source of power for a piece of agricultural machinery, it would
cease to be identified as a "Buick" and hence any harm caused by a
defective part would likely not be traceable back to the corporation.
348. Id. at 58-59.
349. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 1054-55.
352. See id. at 1053.
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This is, perhaps, merely another way of stating that in such a circum-
stance, Buick could not foresee the harm because the car was not be-
ing used as intended by its producer. But Cardozo did not focus on
Buick's intent in determining the scope of foresight.353 He focused
rather on inspection and the market. 35 4 In this context, intent was
relevant, but primarily as it helped the court construct the relation-
ship between the corporation and its product.
355
It was specifically as a marketed commodity that the Model 10
demanded the type of inspection through which it became imbued
with Buick's identity. The very same article produced as a gift
would likely not have required the same degree of inspection or fore-
sight. Thus, for example, in his famous article, Assault Upon the
Citadel, in which he traces the extension of the rule of MacPherson
into the realm of strict liability, William Prosser argued:
In all of the cases in which strict liability has been accepted
and applied, the defendant has been engaged in the business
of selling goods of the particular kind. So far as can be dis-
covered, the question has not even been raised as to
whether the rule might apply to one who is not so engaged.
One may predict with assurance that it will not. The
housewife who sells a jar of jam to her neighbor, or the
owner of a used car who trades it in to a dealer, will obvi-
ously stand on a very different footing so far as the justifi-
able expectations of third parties are concerned.356
The nexus of relations between parties, products, and the market is
central to challenging the citadel of privity. Liability flows from a
particular kind of stance one takes vis-a-vis the market. If the pro-
duction and sale of an item are motivated primarily by the purpose to
engage in market transactions for profit-a defining characteristic of
business corporations-that is, if your identity is defined primarily in
terms of your relation to the market-then you will be subject to li-
ability beyond privity.357 Your market-based identity will travel with
your product to the foreseeable limits of market relations. If your
353. See id. at 1051-55.
354. See id. at 1053-55.
355. See id.
356. Prosser, supra note 106, at 1140-41.
357. See id. at 1101-02, 1123, 1140-42.
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relation to the market is incidental or secondary to your purpose in
selling an object-as with Prosser's example of the housewife-then
your liability is to that extent attenuated." 8
Referring back to Kopytoff's idea that an object can enter, exit
and reenter commodity status at different stages in its biography, we
might similarly trace how a party's relation to the market through the
objects she produces might similarly vary over time. Thus, for ex-
ample, one can imagine in the case of someone like Debbie Fields
that she began by producing a few batches of cookies for sale to
friends and neighbors and then gradually expanded into the corporate
giant, Mrs. Fields' Cookies, with stores across America.359 At some
point along the way, Debbie Fields' relation to the market changed
and we could reasonably expect her to be held liable beyond privity
for defects in her cookies.
D. Liability and Legitimacy
Advertising functions both as a measure of the engagement of a
party's identity in the market and as a means of projecting that iden-
tity outward to consumers. Together, advertising and the product it-
self provide key indexes of the presence of the producer's identity in
the market. Jackson Lears notes that, "[w]ith the coming of mass
production and planned obsolescence during the early twentieth cen-
tury, many manufacturers still sought systematically to surround
their products with a magical aura, to overcome the growing distance
between the manufacturer and the buyer by personalizing the imper-
sonal commodity."
360
Marchand further notes how some public relations campaigns
tried to personalize entire corporations through association with the
identity of a founding director or emblematic employee.361 The cor-
poration and the commodity were mutually implicated in construct-
ing an animating soul for each other.362 Cardozo would hardly liken
his conception of negligence to "magic." Nonetheless, the logic of
358. See id. at 1140-42.
359. See Mrs. Fields' History at http://www.mrsfields.com/history (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2001).
360. LEARS, supra note 58, at 380.
361. See MARCHAND, supra note 58, at 7-17, 26-28.
362. See id. at 1-41.
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his decision in MacPherson involves a similar kind of "animation" of
the "impersonal commodity" in a manner that implicated the "soul"
or identity of the producing corporation.3 63 Cardozo and advertisers
both were concerned with bridging the gulf between distant corpo-
rate producers and individual consumers. 364 "Personalizing" a prod-
uct through advertising involved making a generic commodity ap-
pear more singular and distinctive by infusing it with a particular
identity.365  Cardozo's opinion similarly "personalized" MacPher-
son's Model 10 by infusing it with Buick's identity as a negligent
manufacturer-hence liable. He did so by drawing on his under-
standing of community norms and a "common sense" perception of
the nature of market processes; not "magic" perhaps, but certainly an
embrace of imprecise, intuitive, and contextual methods of legal in-
terpretation.
Advertising and public relations were central to legitimizing the
newly ascendant complex national corporations in the eyes of con-
sumers. 366 As Marchand notes, the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century was a time of intense public debate over the character or
identity of the large corporation.367  A "soulless"3 68 corporation,
without conscience, might reflect the "viciousness" feared by Worm-
ser.369 A vicious corporation would not be trusted, much less sup-
ported, by wary consumers.370 Marchand's book chronicles the ex-
tensive and largely successful efforts by some of America's largest
corporations to craft a corporate soul capable of sustaining public
confidence.371 But advertisements alone were not always enough.
The flip side of professional advertising was fraud and hucksterism,
which also permeated American culture during this era.372 Lears, for
example, notes how the field of patent medicine was particularly rife
363. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051-55 (N.Y.
1916).
364. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051-55; MARCHAND, supra note 58, at
7-10.
365. See LEARS, supra note 58, at 138-39, 380.
366. See MARCHAND, supra note 58, at 1-2, 4-7.
367. See id. at 1-8.
368. See id.
369. See WORMSER, supra note 9, at 100-01.
370. See id.
371. See MARCHAND, supra note 58, at 1-5.
372. See, e.g., LEARS, supra note 58, at 41-69, 137-77.
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with flamboyant and egregiously overstated representations of prod-
uct claims.3 73 Concerns over wild representations for miracle cures
played a major role in the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906, arguably the first major federal intervention into the arena of
regulating product quality.374 In this context, advertisements might
just as readily evoke intimations of fraud as endow a corporation
with personality and soul. During the early decades of the twentieth
century, even mainstream professional advertising firms were con-
stantly struggling against the image of the Barnum-esque hustler on
the make.375 Advertisements, in short, were not always sufficient to
confer legitimacy upon expanding corporate power.
Federal regulation, such as the Pure Food and Drug Act,376 and
such antitrust measures as the Clayton Act 3 77 and the creation of the
Federal Trade Commission,3 78 complemented the project of corpo-
rate advertisement and public relations. Willard Hurst notes that
"[b]etween the 1880's and the 1930's developments in both the law
and the economy made issues of legitimacy central to the course of
public policy concerning the business corporation." 379 Most corpora-
tions eventually accepted a measure of control over their operations
in return for the legitimacy and stability conferred by the imprimatur
of federal regulation.380 Federal regulation, however, also had its
limits. In an era when government was becoming as complex and as
distant from citizens as big business, an alienated public was often
skeptical of politicians and regulators perceived as closely allied with
corporate interests.
381
373. See id. at 154-61.
374. See id. at 157.
375. See id. at 41-69, 142-67.
376. Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938)).
377. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §18 (1994)).
378. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1995)).
379. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 59 (1970).
380. See, e.g., JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL N THE LIBERAL
STATE, 1900-1918 (1968).
381. See, e.g., ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL
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Product liability doctrine provided an added measure of legiti-
macy that was peculiarly well suited to an emerging consumer soci-
ety. Where advertising originated from the corporations themselves,
and regulation came from the government, products liability was a
distinctively intimate and personal means for diverse individuals to
assert their power into market relations with corporations. Advertis-
ing and regulation both played critical roles in creating and sustain-
ing consumer confidence in products manufactured by distant corpo-
rate giants. Product liability added an additional, complementary
dimension that specifically empowered the individual consumer to
assert his or her will as a consumer. Advertisements might make
corporations appealing, federal oversight might make them predict-
able, but product liability made them accountable to individual con-
sumers.
Finally, product liability provided a vehicle, so to speak, through
which the corporation could reclaim and rehabilitate its spoiled iden-
tity. While the suit marked Buick as "negligent," with the payment
of the judgment to MacPherson, Buick's identity in the defective
Model 10 ceased to have any continuing legal relevance. The car
remained defective, but no longer could any harm resulting from it
be attributed back to Buick. The legal proceeding provided closure
that allowed Buick, in effect, to withdraw from any further chapters
in the car's legal biography. Buick's identity as negligent became
bracketed in time and space within a past transaction allowing the
corporation in the future to project a rehabilitated identity of a re-
sponsible party in its ongoing market relations.
VIII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE NEW CORPORATE CITIZEN
Federal regulation, national advertising, and product liability all
emerged during the Progressive Era as powerful means to identify
and situate the modem corporation in American society. The "cor-
porate reconstruction of American capitalism" which for Martin
Sklar marked the ascendance of the corporate-administered market
82
also implicated conceptions of the corporation not only as an eco-
nomic entity but also as a "person." Echoing Sklar's distinction
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE 141-71 (1991); GRANT
MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
382. See SKLAR, supra note 37, at 20.
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between an older proprietary-competitive and a newly ascendant
corporate-administered market form of capitalism, Michael Sandel
argues that federal antitrust regulation embodied both "civic" and
"consumer-oriented" views of the nature and role of the corporation
in American society.383 "Civic" views were represented by argu-
ments for a political economy of citizenship that saw federal regula-
tion of corporations as protecting "the decentralized economy of
small businesses and trades long seen as essential to self-
government." 384 Sandel notes that "producer-based" reform efforts
reflected a republican tradition of political economy in which "pro-
ducer identities mattered because the world of work was seen as the
arena in which, for better or worse, the character of citizens was
formed., 385  Consumer-based reform efforts, by contrast, focused
simply on "how best.., to satisfy" consumer preferences, without
considering how to "improve or restrain" them.386 "The shift to con-
sumer-based reform in the twentieth century," concludes Sandel,
"was thus a shift away from the formative ambition of the republican
tradition, away from the political economy of citizenship. 387
Product liability similarly implicated civic and consumer-based
conceptions of citizenship. The status and role of consumer clearly
predominated as it provided the defining relationships establishing
claims and liability.388 But in its articulation of standards of corpo-
rate responsibility, product liability, at its inception, also had the
"formative ambition" of making corporations better citizens.389 In
empowering consumers, product liability law gave average citizens
an important means to articulate and assert their interests and thereby
set certain limits to corporate power. But it also fostered an atom-
istic, individualized, and procedural conception of individual citizen-
ship decried by Sandel as devoid of substantive commitments and
fostering alienation and disillusion.390  The citizen who brings a
383. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 231-32 (1996).
384. Id. at 232.
385. Id. at 224.
386. Id. at 225.
387. Id.
388. See id. at 221-27.
389. See id. at 225.
390. See id. at 221-27.
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product liability suit vindicates his or her individual rights as a con-
sumer, but in isolation from any larger conception of the public good
or the proper relations among citizens, corporation, and government
on a larger scale. Product liability suits contribute to the mainte-
nance of what Sandel calls a "consumerist vision" which focuses on
the gratification of material wants and promotes a notion of persons
as free, unencumbered selves, who are defined primarily by their
autonomy and ability to exercise free choice. 391 Thus, there was a
cost to the power attained through Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson
and its progeny. Product liability fragmented and individualized op-
position to corporate irresponsibility, making it the concern of indi-
vidual plaintiffs, not of the polity as a whole. Individuals gained
power as consumers, but perhaps at the expense of their solidarity as
citizens.
Product liability also constructed the corporate citizen. Car-
dozo's focus on Buick's choice to introduce its products into the
stream of commerce echoes the liberal focus on choice as the defin-
ing characteristic of the autonomous individual in what Sandel calls
the "procedural republic." 392 Similarly, Lawrence Friedman sees the
early twentieth century as the time during which America emerged as
a "republic of choice" in which "the right to 'be oneself,' to choose
oneself, is placed in a special and privileged position; in which ex-
pression is favored over self-control .... ,3 The corporate citizen
of the procedural republic, anthropomorphized through theories of
corporate personality, was defined by its capacity to choose and was
held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of those
choices. 394 It was primarily evaluated not in terms of its contribution
to substantive social goals but by its capacity to meet individual con-
sumer wants.395 It expressed itself through its products. Product
391. See id. at 93-100, 221-27, 260-62.
392. See generally Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Un-
encumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984) (discussing the history and for-
mation of the "procedural republic").
393. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW,
AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 3 (1990) (emphasis in original).
394. See id. at 193-94.
395. It was precisely this status that Maurice Wormser decried in 1931, argu-
ing that the corporation should be viewed as a public trust, a socialized form of
capitalism that recognized an affirmative duty to the community as a whole.
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liability legitimized and validated corporate expression in products
by providing a measure of accountability.
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson ushered in the new corporate
citizen. Product liability determined that the corporate person manu-
facturing commodities for sale in the market became "present" in its
products through the acts (or omissions) of production and inspec-
tion. As the products traveled out into the market, the corporation's
identity traveled with them. The boundaries of the corporate person
thus extended outward across the nation through a complex web of
social and economic market relations. The product, as a critical site
for the encounter between corporation and consumer, became a
nexus through which legal relations of responsibility and liability
were determined, mediated, and enforced. Product liability empow-
ered the consumer by providing access to the corporation through its
products. Ironically, it also empowered the corporation by freeing it
from the substantive burdens of a more civic conception of corporate
citizenship. Instead, the logic of product liability supported an
evaluation of the corporation primarily in terms of its ability to sat-
isfy consumer demands independent of any larger social purpose.
See WORMSER, supra note 9, at 226-42. The following year the calamities of
the Depression also prompted Adolf A. Berle and Edwin Merrick Dodd to en-
gage in a debate over the social responsibilities of the corporation. See
BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 131-32. Berle expressed skepticism that legal doc-
trine would recognize corporate responsibility to society absent legislative in-
tervention, while Dodd thought existing law capable of expanding to accom-
modate newly pressing concerns over the public responsibilities of
corporations. See id. at 131-32 (providing a thoughtful review of this ex-
change).
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